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FOREWORD
The topic of Russo-European Union (EU) relations
is one of the most important security issues in
Europe and Russia because this relationship will help
determine the security situation throughout Eastern
and Central Europe well into the future. The course of
this relationship also will influence in large measure
the extent to which Russia moves toward realizing
its historic European vocation and its proclaimed
ambition to become a democracy. On the other side, the
relationship will influence significantly the capability
of the EU to function effectively as a union of European
states, possibly including Russia, and other European
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States
like Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia.
Admittedly this relationship is in a rather precarious
state. But it is essential that policymakers and analysts
understand what the problems are that have impeded
Russia’s integration with Europe if we and they are
to overcome these obstacles. Therefore, this superb
analysis by Dr. Cynthia Roberts is highly important to
any effective understanding of both Russia’s and the
EU’s future trajectory.
This monograph is part of a series of publications
on aspects of Russian defense and foreign policy that
derived from a conference entitled “The U.S. and
Russia: Regional Security Issues and Interests.” It
was cosponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute;
the Ellison Center for Russian, East European,
and Central Asian Studies at the Jackson School of
International Studies at the University of Washington;
the Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security; and
the Institute for Global and Regional Security Studies.
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The conference and this series represent a part of SSI’s
efforts to provide expert analysis of some of the most
urgent challenges to security in today’s world.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
More than 15 years after the collapse of the Soviet
Union and two decades after the last Soviet President,
Mikhail Gorbachev, raised hopes that Russia would
liberalize and join a common European home,
Moscow again resorts to authoritarian means amid the
continuing absence of a mutual agenda for Russia’s
integration into Western institutions. Since the end
of the Cold War, Russia and the West have averted
renewed confrontation but managed only to craft a
series of half-formed, suboptimal partnerships—with
the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and the Group of 71—in which
Russia is neither anchored by democratic rules nor
fully excluded by Western institutions. These “special
relationships,” which have been often turbulent, are
now seriously strained by Russia’s stronger geopolitical
position, boosted by sustained high economic growth
and market power in energy, and newly-emboldened
rulers, who seek to renegotiate terms.
Why did “special relationships” materialize
between Russia and the dominant Euro-Atlantic
institutions instead of a Concert of Europe, a Cold
Peace, full integration into Western institutions, direct
confrontation, or a different outcome? How durable is
the present, second best equilibrium? Which factors
would increase the prospects for a mutually-beneficial
agenda for integration? What are the risks that a
more authoritarian and nationalist Russia will grow
defiant and revanchist over its unfavorable terms of
engagement, leading not to closer cooperation but a
reemergence of two Europes, one led by the EU and
NATO as the core and the other centered on Russia,
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relegated to the periphery and tempted to act as a
spoiler and a closer ally of rogue regimes in Eurasia
and elsewhere?
This monograph, which focuses on Russia and the
EU, explains why such special relationships tend to
produce shallow collaboration, symbolic summitry, and
costly standoffs. It underscores the bargaining problems
which block closer cooperation in areas of mutual
interest, from managing energy interdependence,
instability in the Balkans, and nuclear proliferation in
the Middle East, to negotiating a new partnership and
cooperation agreement. The ongoing disputes are over
terms, not just enforcement, and rooted in asymmetries
in power, uncertainty about the distributional costs
and benefits of engagement, and mistrust generated
by Russia’s continued unwillingness or inability to
lock-in the liberal domestic structures necessary to
make credible commitments or converge to European
norms.
Domestic interests and political veto players
further work against deep cooperation. Russia’s autocrats and dominant elites who gain phenomenal
wealth from their positions of power have a stake in
a nontransparent, illiberal Russian state and eschew
international agreements requiring strict conditionality
and accountability. Russia even has shown its willingness to cut the flow of energy supplies to two key
transit states, Ukraine and Belarus, over price disputes,
notwithstanding the disruptions to its EU customers
farther west. For its part, the EU often is unable to
impose discipline on the national politics and domestic
interests of 27 member states, making it easier for
Moscow to cut myopic, bilateral deals such as the
German-Russian energy cartel which is building a gas
pipeline under the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine and
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Poland, which depend heavily on Russia for energy.
Warsaw, in turn, has been willing to use its EU veto
to block the start of negotiations on a new EU-Russia
partnership and cooperation treaty, underscoring
political and economic disputes with Moscow. For both
the Europeans and Russians, mistrust persists, and both
sides are profoundly ambivalent about the desirability
of deepening their relationship. Thus, it remains to be
seen whether Russia’s special relationships with the EU
and other Euro-Atlantic institutions will succumb to the
negative pressures or persist in their present imperfect
form for lack of a realistic, superior alternative.
ENDNOTE
1. The “Group of 7” (G-7) industrialized democratic powers
was subsequently renamed the “Group of 8” (G-8) to include
Russia in its political but not its core economic deliberations. When
Russia was invited by President Bill Clinton to become a regular
participant, then Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin made it clear
that the G-7 would have to reconstitute itself to do its important
financial business outside of the new G-8 process.
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RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:
THE SOURCES AND LIMITS
OF “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS”
The foremost unresolved challenge for European
security at the beginning of the 21st century is how best
to engage a Russia that is not a member of the leading
international and Euro-Atlantic institutions composed
of market democracies, notably the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union
(EU), and is lurching back towards authoritarian rule.
For the past 2 decades, according to a prominent
specialist, the “central foreign policy agenda” for
both Russia and the West, starting with Mikhail
Gorbachev’s wish for a “common European home,”
was Russia’s integration into Western institutions. In
this view, recent developments signal “a dangerous
drift” backwards, away from the mutually-agreed
“strategic agenda of integration.”1 A careful study
of the record, however, reveals an all around lack of
commitment to full integration from the outset and an
absence of consensus about how to structure post-Cold
War relations. Nor is there evidence of a feared “onesided courtship,” where much weight is put on Western
efforts to cooperate but “not on Russia engaging the
West.”2 Claims that an economically resurgent Russia
now wants to strike out entirely on its own and has
lost all interest in joining Western clubs similarly are
overblown.3
Neither fully excluded nor embraced, Russia has
been relegated to the awkward position of having
“special relationships” with NATO and the EU, much
like its initial interaction with the “Group of 7” (G7) industrialized powers, subsequently renamed the



“Group of 8” (G-8) to include Russia in its political
but not its core economic deliberations. Notably these
are international institutions in which the Russian
Federation did not inherit outright membership from
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (such
as its permanent seat on the United Nations [UN]
Security Council) or to date has been unable to qualify
for membership, such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO).
Although an improvement over Cold War tensions
and the “peaceful coexistence” that prevailed during
a time of nuclear and ideological confrontation, such
“special relationships” hardly form the basis of an
ideal post-Cold War settlement. They are nothing
like the special relationship between Britain and the
United States whose close ties derive as much from
common values as common interests. Yet 15 years after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, these relationships
are the foundation stones for a suboptimal, East-West
equilibrium of partial integration. The United States
and its European allies in Western institutions such
as NATO and the EU promote stability by involving
Russia in a mixture of symbolic and substantive
cooperative endeavors, while creating a structure
in which Russia is allowed to participate only as a
subordinate nonmember. A partially reformed Russia,
in essence, has been partially integrated into a Western
hierarchy, and with respect to top tier organizations,
can claim equal membership only in the G-8, now a
club long on summitry and short on substance.4 Despite
alternating talk of closer strategic partnership and
punishing Moscow for its antidemocratic behavior,
both Russia and the West have a stake in perpetuating
“special relationships” because no superior alternative
is feasible. Russia’s situation thus contrasts unfavorably



with more adaptable and less prestige conscious
Central and East European countries that have made
successful transitions to market democracies and
joined the EU, NATO, and other Western institutions
in the last decade.
These “special relationships” are now strained by
the revival of Russia’s power and newly self-confident
government which seeks to renegotiate terms. Since
2005, Moscow has signaled a willingness to use its
market power in energy to advance Russia’s influence
in the post-Soviet space and dealings with the West.
Russia’s sustained economic growth rates of about
6 percent since 1999 and soaring energy prices have
boosted Moscow’s coffers and geopolitical ambitions
dramatically while transforming Europe’s 1990s
distribution of power. Influential elites have resurrected
the idea of strengthening the commonwealth of postSoviet states, with the expectation, however fanciful,
that Moscow can create a counter power center and
leverage its “union” to craft a more “equal partnership”
with Brussels and its Western partners. Although
frustrated by lack of progress and European and
American obstinacy, Moscow has not abandoned the
goal of upgrading its status or ruled out the possibility
of full membership in one or more of the West’s premier
clubs. A persistent contradiction, however, is that
Russia remains averse to commit to new bargains that
involve conditionality (with the exception of WTO), a
sine qua non for Europe and the United States which are
more skeptical than ever about Russia’s potential for
integration.
The problem with partial integration is that it favors
shallow cooperation and is prone to crises, underscoring
continued competition and persistent uncertainty,
mistrust, and a values gap between Russia and the



West. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and the
West have averted renewed confrontation, checking
crises over NATO expansion, Kosovo and the Orange
Revolution, and gas crisis in Ukraine, while containing
competitive impulses in the former Soviet space and
elsewhere. Although avoiding the worst outcomes,
they also have failed to achieve the ideal of a liberal
democratic and market-driven Russia integrated into
the Western community and its leading international
institutions. There is a risk that an emboldened, energyrich, more authoritarian Russia will grow defiant and
revanchist over its unfavorable terms of engagement,
leading not to a deepening of cooperation but instead
to the reemergence of two Europes, one led by the
EU and NATO as the core and the other centered on
Russia, relegated to the periphery and tempted to
act as a spoiler and a closer ally of rogues and rising
authoritarian states.
What explains why a “special relationship” materialized between Russia and the dominant EuroAtlantic institutions instead of a Concert of Europe, a
Cold Peace, full integration into Western institutions,
or a different outcome? How durable is the present
partial integration equilibrium? What changes would
be necessary to increase the prospects for Russia’s
integration into an undivided, democratic Europe?
This monograph, which focuses on the sources
and limits of the post-Cold War relationship between
Russia and the European Union, is one part of a larger
study on Russia’s “special relationships” with NATO,
the EU, and G-8. In contrast to most works on this topic,
it draws insights from the social science literature on
bargaining problems to explain the constrained scope
of interaction between Russia and the EU. I argue that
three main factors underpin this special relationship



and the larger partial integration equilibrium while
undercutting prospects for more and less optimal
alternative outcomes. They are asymmetries in the
relationship, commitment problems, and ambiguous
stakes in deeper cooperation resulting in part from
distributional issues.
• First, fundamental asymmetries define the
relationship in which Russia is a large, relatively
self-sufficient exporter of energy and other raw
materials, but its economy is small in relation to
the EU. As the stronger side, the EU is able to
hold out for its preferred bargain in which Russia
transforms, adopts universal and European
values and norms, and achieves integration
without membership. Failing this, Brussels
will agree only to shallow or narrowly focused
interim agreements with the added veneer of
high-level summitry and international prestige.
These arrangements are considered preferable to
no agreement which could provoke a backlash
from a critical energy supplier or, even worse, a
return to confrontation. Moscow objects to EU’s
agenda-setting power and seeks to redistribute
gains by fostering greater dependency on
Russian gas and by circumventing Brussels in
favor of bilateral interactions with European
capitals.
• Second, Russia’s absence of strong democratic
institutions and rule of law to hold both
economic oligarchs and the state accountable,
coupled with uncertainty about future
outcomes, means it is impossible for Moscow
to make credible commitments to uphold
international or domestic bargains. Brussels
requires convergence to European norms and


rule of law as a prerequisite for implementing a
deep EU-Russia partnership. Russia’s essential
predicament is that it will be difficult to escape
its partial reform trap and lock-in a liberal
political and economic transformation without
the discipline and incentives of Western
integration, but Europe (and the United States)
is unwilling to deepen cooperation before Russia
democratizes.5
• Third, both sides have ambiguous stakes in
deeper cooperation in the foreseeable future.
Europeans are preoccupied with recent and
planned enlargements as well as deepening and
broadening the scope of their own interactions
within the limits of public acceptance. Russia’s
fate is of long-term concern, but because even
energy involves mutual dependencies, it is
not a pressing priority and might eventually
resolve itself through gradual convergence to
European norms. For their part, Russians are
profoundly ambivalent about integration with
a Europe which insists on imposing it values.
Besides concerns about sovereignty are the
preferences and interests of dominant leaders
and elites who have a stake in a nontransparent
powerful Russian state. Moscow prefers equal
partnership without conditions to special
relationships or exclusion, but to date has been
unable to secure this outcome despite a “Russia
first” tendency among Europe’s great powers.
Moreover, the Russian government recognizes
no contradiction in simultaneously pursuing
European integration and an economic
community within the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) with Russia as the


central force, as well as partnerships with rising
powers in Asia.
The monograph begins by tracing the sources
of special relationships to bargaining dynamics
influenced by asymmetries in power, objectives, and
domestic political pressures. Next, it turns to consider
a more optimal outcome as demonstrated by the EU
integration model and the difficulties in extending this
approach to post-communist countries now outside the
accession process. The second half of the monograph
highlights the substantive aspects of the EU-Russia
relationship, underscoring the practical implications of
conflicting goals, the sources of Russia’s commitment
problems and ambivalence about integration.
The Roots of Special Relationships:
Bargaining Problems.
Russia and Europe have a mutual stake in deeper
cooperation. The EU is Russia’s most important
trading partner—remarkably three times larger than
trade with other post-Soviet (non-EU) states—and the
administration of President Vladimir Putin, which
seeks rapid economic modernization and growth, has
upgraded the place of the EU in Russian priorities.
Europeans differ broadly in their attitudes towards
Russia, but the EU recognizes that Russia presents
“the most important, the most urgent, and the most
challenging task that the EU faces at the beginning
of the 21st century.”6 Besides depending heavily on
Russian oil and gas supplies, the EU with recent and
future enlargements will share borders or be in close
proximity to Russia from the Arctic Circle to the
Black Sea, an area fraught with tensions and crises.



Perhaps as much to convince themselves, the two
sides periodically reaffirm a “commitment to ensure
that EU enlargement will bring the EU and Russia
closer together in a Europe without dividing lines” for
durable, peaceful engagement.7
At one level, the European approach appears
to follow the multidimensional functionalist and
institutional logic of gradually and indirectly reintegrating Russia into Europe and a stable post-Cold War
order.8 But what are the driving forces of Europe’s
long-term, incremental strategy—the pressures of
interdependence and normative convergence or a
preference to limit liabilities and a deliberate reluctance
to institutionalize closer ties? This monograph argues
that the latter contention better explains the record.
Russians are embracing illiberal attitudes9 and moving
closer to the authoritarian model of a one-party state in
lieu of converging on Western or European norms of
democracy and human rights.10 Moreover, economic
interaction is not spilling over into political and
security integration. Lacking secure property rights
and rule of law, Russian politics is preoccupied with
the distribution and redistribution of property. Gaining
political power is the surest means to capturing the
state’s resources and phenomenal wealth. The resulting
competition and corruption militates against the
consolidation of a repressive authoritarian regime, but
it also affects foreign policy, for instance by favoring
outcomes that keep oil prices high, such as prolonging
the nuclear stand-off with Iran.
Institutionalist and liberal expectations that Russia
would develop markets and democratic institutions
rapidly and squarely choose modernization and
integration into the interdependent, democratic community of nations foundered on the many obstacles



to successful transitions in post-communist countries
and the former Soviet Union, in particular.11 Theorists
who predict that the development of shared values
leads to deep cooperation and harmonious relations
similarly overestimated the degree to which norms
in Russia were changing during Perestroika and the
first post-Soviet decade. Optimistic forecasts, such as
Mikhail Gorbachev’s expectation that Russia would
join a common European home, were grounded less in
the construction of new identities and institutions, let
alone geopolitical realities, than expressions of wishful
thinking. Even Russia’s 1992 application to the Council
of Europe, the European organization imposing the least
demands on new entrants, was delayed until 1996 when
it was decided that “integration” and “cooperation” are
preferable to “isolation” and “confrontation,” despite
concerns that Russia fell short of European standards
for democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Only 4
years later, in April 2000, the Parliamentary Assembly
suspended Russia’s voting rights in response to reports
of human rights abuses by Russian forces in Chechnya
and recommended proceedings to expel Russia from
the Council.12 Instead of promoting such common
values as tolerance, mutual respect, and standards for
safeguarding civil and political rights, Moscow has
impeded the work of human rights nongovernmental
organizations and constrained “the Council’s ability to
promote normative socialization within the country.”13
Meanwhile, after pushing at the end of the Cold War
for a leading role for the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the only Euro-Atlantic
institution in which Russia has an equal voice, Moscow
soured on the organization as it exposed electoral fraud
in post-Communist countries.
Institutional theory may be a poor predictor
of the EU-Russia special relationship because it


overemphasizes the positive role of institutions to
deal with problems of international cooperation while
ignoring cases of costly, noncooperative standoffs or
“nonserious bargaining, where states ‘commit’ to vague
agreements for various political purposes.” As James
Fearon shows, the dynamics of such cases turn on a
distributional problem about terms for any mutually
beneficial bargain or concerns about the feasibility
of monitoring or enforcement. The first problem is
indicated when we observe “costly standoffs” in
which the dispute has a war-of-attrition aspect, and
the parties suffer the costs of holding out for better
terms instead of striking a deal that would make both
sides better off. Various possible agreements exist that
the parties would prefer to no agreement, but they
disagree in their ranking of them. Since this process
involves uncertainty and private information, it is not
uncommon for the two sides to engage in bluffing and
misrepresentation of their true positions. In the second
problem, even when the “shadow of the future” is long,
the parties may think effective monitoring is infeasible,
and incentives to renege will discourage any serious
bargaining or lead to weak, preliminary agreements.14
The Russia-EU relationship involves both types of
problems: (1) recurring costly standoffs in which the
stronger side (the EU in most issue areas) demonstrates
it can incur costs longer, such as the confrontation
over Moscow’s initial refusal to extend the RussiaEU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)
to the 10 new EU members incorporated in 2004; and
(2) uncertainty about future intentions, resulting in
the establishment of vague interim arrangements,
examples of which include the EU Common Strategy
on Russia (1999-2003) and the plethora of “dialogues”
(e.g., on political and security matters) and “action
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plans” (to cooperate on combating organized crime,
etc.) agreed upon at summits and other meetings. One
important test of the bargaining model for special
relationships is in the energy area, particularly EURussia negotiations over a regulatory regime and
liberalization of upstream and downstream markets
and access to pipelines. The area of greatest mutual
interdependence, energy cooperation, is a case in which
Europe faces strong divergent national, political, and
security considerations as well as asymmetries favoring
Russia. Moscow possesses some energy trump cards
and has been willing to hold out for a better deal than
offered to date.
A second test is the development of the Four
Common Spaces first initiated in 2003 at the St.
Petersburg EU-Russia summit—a common economic
space (building on the notion of a Common European
Economic Space); a common space of freedom, security,
and justice; a space of cooperation in the field of external
security; and a space of research and education. To the
extent that the common spaces remain abstract and
unfulfilled ideas, with less potential for momentum and
substance than even Europe’s Neighborhood Policy for
engaging its regional partners on a nonmember basis,
this constitutes shallow cooperation characteristic of
special relationships. Such an outcome likely reflects an
inability to resolve competing bargaining preferences.
Given that Russia prefers equal partnership while the
Europeans emphasize normative integration without
membership, a shift in emphasis from the PCA to
substantive progress on the four common spaces could
signal a shift in the distribution of power, although both
fit the special relationship model. The same pattern of
bargaining problems is likely to influence any followon agreement to the PCA which runs through 2007.
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Partial Integration vs. Full Integration.
Bargaining theory, unlike institutionalist or cooperation theory, recognizes the centrality of power to
international politics—particularly to the determination
of who plays the game, writes the rules, and changes
the payoff matrix. Power allows some actors to secure a
more favorable distribution of benefits in international
bargains and to restrict the choice sets of others, even
to the point of compelling them to accept outcomes
that may leave them worse off.15 Thus, in contrast to an
institutional setting in which all members participate
on equal terms, in a “partial integration” equilibrium,
the dominant coalition seeks to lower the costs and risks
of locking in gains at the expense of weaker rivals or
defeated adversaries.16 Sensitive to the possibility that
such steps may foster security concerns or revanchism,
the stronger side prudently refrains from isolating
potentially disruptive weaker rivals (or former foes),
easing their adjustment to a diminished position by
offering compensation or side-payments in the form
of “special relationships.”17 Such relationships involve
only their partial integration into the institutions
controlled by more powerful global actors. As in
the examples of Russia and NATO and Ukraine and
NATO, the recipient gains enhanced international
prestige but otherwise partial integration creates few
tangible positive incentives while imposing little or no
conditionality.18
Although power and interest underpin the partial
integration model, it remains to be explained why the
dominant coalition keeps its distance instead of taming
the ambitions of potential challengers by inviting them
to jump on the bandwagon, and why, apart from
weakness, an excluded opponent accepts such an

12

unfavorable bargain. The outsider, for example, could
shift instead to a position of confrontation which might
attract the support of other dissatisfied actors and
result in superior deals. The bargaining dynamics that
lead to special relationships and a partial integration
equilibrium as opposed to noncooperation or closer
associations appear to involve three factors that are
not present or significant in alternative outcomes.
The first is a preference by one or both sides to limit
liabilities, i.e., to avoid making a commitment to deeper
cooperation because of an ongoing dispute over terms
or concerns about enforcement. Neither side, however,
is likely to leave the bargaining table permanently
because of the second factor—a strong incentive to
avoid a complete break in relations, given substantial
interdependence in areas of important mutual interests.
Third, the convergence on a special relationship is
likely to be reinforced by a lack of domestic political
consensus over the benefits or feasibility of an optimal
bargain and particularly by the presence of strong
domestic opponents. Although a special relationship
is suboptimal for long-term security, stability, and
prosperity, it may be the compromise position when
leaders face strong domestic opponents who deem
deeper cooperation or full integration as inimical to
their interests. Likewise, the prestige gained by both
sides from finding some common ground, coupled with
the absence of conditionality allows political leaders
to create the symbols and some of the trappings of
partnership while still pursuing contradictory aims. For
example, Moscow presses to deepen its participation
in the decisionmaking structures of NATO and the
EU’s security committees, while refusing to introduce
democratic controls and greater transparency in its
own defense establishment. Similarly, Moscow relishes
the G-8 and EU-Russia summitry that highlights its
13

leadership role in helping to resolve major international
disputes, such as over Iran’s nuclear program, while
increasing sales of surface-to-air missiles to Teheran
and cutting deals to upgrade Iran’s Soviet-made
bombers, fighter aircraft, and main battle tanks. Special
relationships are welcomed, not least because they
help protect political leaders from pressures to resolve
major contradictions in their strategies and policies.
The two-level domestic-international interactions
which underscore the partial integration equilibrium
differ significantly from the bargaining dynamics
that have informed the full integration or accession
model of the EU.19 The central differences are twofold. First, promising candidates for membership
in the EU demonstrated in many ways their strong
preference for a “return to Europe” and desire to
join the EU. In particular, governments signaled the
seriousness of their commitment to reform and the
rules of the organization by agreeing to a rigorous
preaccession process that would involve “tying the
hands” of current and future rulers.20 Second, the EU
signaled its willingness to consider new applicants
according to specified criteria, which was designed
to reveal whether compliance with the organization’s
conditionality requirements sufficiently corresponded
to the applicant’s domestic interests and a shared system
of norms and understandings perceived as legitimate.21
Acceptable bargains were predicated further on the
understanding that the long-term economic benefits to
existing members outweigh the short-term adjustment
costs of enlargement. The next section describes how
these factors worked in the successful transformations
of Central and East European countries and their
integration into the EU and then turns to a preliminary
examination of the variations in the EU-Russia relationship.
14

International and Domestic Incentives to Reform:
The Successful European Integration Model.
When the Cold War ended, ironically the EU was
focused inward on deepening the terms of interaction
among its members. European governments had not
yet created the institutions necessary to develop a
common foreign and security policy, leaving such
matters entirely in the hands of the individual member
governments. Even worse than merely bad timing, as
one observer recounts, “Few politicians were in any
mood for grand gestures or financial generosity.” They
put priority on the reunification of Germany, “and
the evident political risk and financial expense of that
unification made many leaders even more reluctant to
commit themselves to enlarging the EU as a whole.”22
The EU delayed a decision on further enlargement
another 2 years and then moved slowly on accession
negotiations with even the three Central European
front-runners among the Visegrad states.
By comparison, for many Central Europeans, the
goal of EU membership and the rewards associated
with it created “a normative focal point for domestic
adjustment efforts, often in advance of participation
in existing organizations or western demands.”23
However, lacking a credible EU commitment to enlarge, coupled with specific accession criteria, aspiring
entrants tended to push for membership while pursuing
domestic agendas that conformed to existing patterns
of government and prevailing interests, whether or not
they were compatible with membership requirements.24
Only when the aspirants were assessed publicly
against precise criteria and informed of their prospects
were the international costs of domestic practices such
as anti-democratic behavior, rent-seeking, corruption,
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and ethnic nationalism revealed to electorates which
generally favored Western integration. This approach
tended to make pro-Western liberal and moderate
parties more attractive to voters even when they were
in the opposition. Still a domestic backlash could not
be ruled out if domestic groups that stood to lose
from accession organized and mobilized against
conditionality and even membership.25
The three Central European countries that most
quickly transitioned to market democracies and gained
entry to the EU had “regimes-in-waiting” when the
communist period ended. Consensus prevailed among
elites and in society on the goals of “returning to
Europe” and creating a liberal political and economic
order.26 In Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
(the so-called Visegrad countries), even reformed
communist parties, which transformed themselves into
social democratic parties and successfully reentered
politics, embraced economic reform, and the quest to
join Europe. The former Eastern bloc countries stood
to gain large tangible and intangible economic, social,
political, and security benefits from full membership in
the EU (and NATO). However, their strong motivation
was counterbalanced by a weak bargaining position in
relations with a European community reluctant to pay
the economic and political costs of EU enlargement
and preoccupied with deepening their own relations.
Despite the West’s endorsement of a democratic, free,
and undivided Europe, EU members (prominently
led by France) resisted challenging powerful domestic
interests in sectors such as steel, textiles, and agriculture,
which benefited from subsidies from the EU budget
and extensive protectionist policies, including against
East European imports.27
The Visegrad countries persevered in the face
of blatant protectionism as they redirected trade
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from east to west, persistently pressing the EU for
precise guidance on how to prepare for membership,
beyond the “anticipatory adaptations” in legislation
already under way in the early 1990s.28 By 1993, the
EU acknowledged the long-term geopolitical and
economic benefits of enlargement, despite continuing
distributional disputes over short-term economic costs.
The resulting “Copenhagen criteria” (and further
refinements) stipulated the political and economic
terms for the preaccession process, emphasizing
democratic stability, rule of law, human rights,
protection of minorities, and a functioning market
economy. In addition, prospective members were
expected to accept in full all of the existing rights and
obligations of the EU, contained in some 95,000 pages
of the acquis communautaire.
EU conditionality not only helped lock-in liberal
reforms in the front-runners for accession, which
already were proving that the simultaneous and rapid
introduction of competitive politics and markets were
conducive to economic growth.29 It also signaled
electorates elsewhere in East Central Europe that
they would pay a price for illiberal regimes fostering
aggressive nationalism, economic corruption, rentseeking, and a host of poor governance practices that
were tolerated when Greece was admitted in 1981
during the Cold War but would now block future
accessions.30 Gradually, the EU shifted from what
Milada Vachudova calls “passive leverage”—the draw
of the EU’s economic benefits for its members and
discriminatory treatment of nonmembers—to “active
leverage” which, in addition to conditionality, involves
“the deliberate engagement with the domestic politics
of states applying for membership.”31
By reducing information asymmetries and boosting
the political fortunes of fledging liberal opposition
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groups in the partially reformed East European states,
the EU demonstrated that merit and the rigorous
application of EU rules and norms could trump political
myth-making by illiberal ruling elites who dominated
their home media markets and pretended to comply
with EU requirements.32 Thus, the EU and other
Western institutions used their leverage to ensure free
and fair elections after 1995 in Romania, Slovakia, and
Bulgaria; and subsequently when illiberal rulers were
replaced, Brussels compelled the new governments
to tackle difficult reforms of the state and economy,
such as creating an independent judiciary and civil
service and privatizing the banking sector. Although
compliance varies across countries with the quality and
depth of the reforms, it is likely that changes essential
for good governance “would have been slower, less
transparent, and more clientalistic absent the EU
accession process.”33 In short, since the mid-1990s, the
EU provided the “crucial external push that has altered
domestic interests in favor of accomplishing some of
the key tasks of post-communism.”34
In 2004, the EU embraced 10 new members, 8 of
which were post-communist states. With an average
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of roughly
half of the existing EU 15 members, the 10 new
members nonetheless faced up to 7 years of barriers on
labor mobility and could expect to receive substantially
smaller amounts of aid from the EU budget than prior
entrants such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, who
had succeeded largely in protecting their privileged
positions. In return for valued long-term economic
and geopolitical gains, the new members, as a result
of their weak bargaining position, had to make
concessions to satisfy the domestic interests and shortterm adjustment costs of the EU-15 members.35 Recent
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research also suggests that although the new Central
European members benefit from trade access, increased
foreign direct investment,36 and reduced corruption,
it is likely that higher public expenditures and taxes
to support social welfare systems and implement EU
regulations have put downward pressure on growth
rates since 1999.37
From the standpoint of the West European EU15, rational cost-benefit considerations involving the
efficiency gains from an enlarged EU, manageable
adjustment costs for bringing in new members whose
combined GDP (measured in terms of purchasing power
parity [PPP]) was less than 10 percent of the EU GDP,
and concerns about the risks and costs of instability
if Central Europe was not anchored firmly appear to
explain why initially reluctant members of the EU-15
eventually followed Germany and other proponents
of enlargement.38 Nonetheless, a persistent tension
exists between the EU as a reluctant expansionist and
the open door stipulated by Article 49 of the Treaty of
Maastricht to any European state which seeks to apply
for entry.
Prospects for Anchoring Post-Communist
Neighbors outside the EU.
On March 11, 2003, 18 years to the day that Mikhail
Gorbachev became the last General Secretary of the
USSR, Brussels issued a new framework for engaging
with its “new neighbors” along the expanding
periphery—those countries which the EU did not
expect would ever join the community. Paradoxically,
nearly a decade and half after the end of the Cold War,
EU leaders quietly acknowledged in this document
that the “incentive to reform created by the prospect of
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membership” unarguably had proven to be the EU’s
most influential foreign policy instrument. However,
the purpose of Europe’s Neighborhood Policy was
clearly to discourage new applicants for membership.
It aimed instead to develop a “zone of prosperity and
a friendly neighborhood,” what the EU calls a “ring of
friends,” so as to avoid new dividing lines in Europe.
In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared
values and effective implementation of political,
economic, and institutional reforms, the EU offers its
neighbors the prospect of a stake in its internal market,
and, following further integration and liberalization,
the possibility of “promoting the free movement of
persons, goods, services, and capital (four freedoms).”
As then Commissioner for External Relations Chris
Patten explained,
Over the past decade, the Union’s most successful foreign
policy instrument has undeniably been the promise of
EU membership. This is not sustainable. For the coming
decade, we need to find new ways to export the stability,
security and prosperity we have created within the
enlarged EU. We should begin by agreeing on a clearer
vision for relations with our neighbours.39

Russia reacted negatively to the EU’s “Wider
Europe-Neighbourhood” framework, resentful of
being lumped together with countries with histories
of nondemocratic governance and poor human rights
records. Even worse, Moscow felt marginalized as one
of many Eastern neighbors instead of a power with a
special role in Europe’s security and stability.40 However, during the 1990s, the Russian government had
agreed to a puffed-up, earlier variant of this approach
to selective nonmembers in the form of a Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). As discussed
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below, to a large degree, the PCA reflected the EU’s
market power and Russia’s relative weakness. A decade
later, Moscow’s position had improved substantially,
and as a major exporter of hydrocarbons, it gained
additional leverage from soaring energy prices and
monopoly control over infrastructure.
The Framework of Relations: Building a Special
Relationship in Lieu of Russia’s Membership in EU.
The legal basis of the EU-Russia relationship
remains the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
(PCA), signed by President Boris Yeltsin and EU
leaders at Corfu in 1994, in force since December 1997,
and due to expire in 2007 or automatically be renewed
annually under the treaty’s provisions.41 At the time,
Moscow sought relationships with both the EU and
the major European powers but had not yet worked
out a set of coherent objectives or a coordinated
policy process for developing those relationships.42 By
comparison, Europeans already had established three
guiding principles for dealing with post-Soviet Russia:
(1) to promote Russia’s transformation to a market
democracy; (2) to make clear that implementation of
the planned partnership between the EU and Russia
presupposes the accomplishment of Russia’s political
and economic reforms; and (3) to gain Russia’s
commitment to “common values” and a framework of
Western norms without any expectation of prospective
membership in the EU (emphasis added). That all
three were embodied in the agreement testifies to the
EU’s stronger bargaining position as well as the early
consensus in Europe on distinguishing future accession
countries in Central and Eastern Europe from Russia
and other CIS countries.
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The post-communist countries in the first group,
many of whom became EU member states in 2004,
were offered “Europe Agreements,” which aimed
to prepare candidate countries for membership
and clearly specified integration into the European
Community as the final objective. In contrast, Russia,
Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics (except the
Baltic states which were included in the first group)
similarly were expected to uphold the rule of law and
human rights and converge with European norms and
rules, but could only look forward to the establishment
of partnerships with the EU or else be marginalized on
the periphery of European affairs.
Beyond supporting Russia’s transformation, the
aims of the “partnership” specified the promotion
of trade, including the creation of conditions for the
establishment of a free trade area and the development
of a political dialogue to promote “increasing convergence” on “international issues of mutual concern, thus
increasing security and stability.” The PCA liberalized
trade on the basis of reciprocal most-favored-nation
(MFN) access to markets for trade in goods and
contains provisions for cooperation on competition
matters, business and investment, and prevention of
illegal activities. The institutions created by the PCA
regulate EU-Russia interactions and provide for regular
meetings at various levels structured to accommodate
the EU’s rotational presidency and bureaucratic
operations more than the purposes of the partnership.
The chaotic events in Russia during the 1990s,
particularly the derailing of reforms and the first
war in Chechnya not only delayed the agreement’s
entry into force but also stymied its implementation.
Russia was among those post-communist countries
that failed to undertake radical reforms quickly and
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comprehensively and fell into a partial reform trap.
In the polarized politics of the Boris Yeltsin years, the
Kremlin used the resources of state to win political
support and this proclivity, together with political
and administrative lawlessness, piecemeal reform,
and insider privatizations facilitated rent seeking,
corruption, and pervasive theft.43 The early big
winners were concentrated interest groups—typically
industrial enterprise insiders, tycoons trading natural
resources, bankers, and local officials—that gained
substantial rents or profited from the notorious “loans
for shares” scheme in which Russia’s most valuable
enterprises were sold in rigged auctions for fire sale
prices. These economic oligarchs developed a stake
in “maintaining a partial reform equilibrium” while
the costs of transformation were spread throughout
society.44 According to one estimate, eight shareholder
groups controlled 85 percent of the value of Russia’s 64
largest privately owned companies by the end of 2001.45
These groups penetrated all parts of the state structure
to protect and expand their gains. By “capturing the
state,” they were able to block objectionable policies
as well as needed structural reforms and efficiency
gains.46
Electoral backlash through vigorous political
competition prompts the reforms necessary to escape
the partial reform trap. However, in Russia, electoral
politics were not free and fair; political polarization
stalled progress; and fundamental democratic institutions, including an independent judiciary, private
property rights and rule of law, which are necessary
to hold the state and economic oligarchs accountable,
never took root.47 This toxic mix created uncertainty
about future political and economic conditions and
an ongoing war of attrition over policies and their
implementation.48 In such conditions, it is impossible
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for governments to make credible commitments to
respect property rights or international bargains.49
Meanwhile, European protectionism, trade disputes, and concerns about Russian politics overshadowed strategic issues. Europeans also were preoccupied
with their own radical internal transformation associated inter alia with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993,
which provided for monetary integration and a
common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and the
Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, which envisioned the
progressive development of a European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP) and an improved capacity to
cope with challenges such as those posed by conflict in
the former Yugoslavia.
Dismayed by the negative developments and crises
in Russia, the EU attempted to give the objectives of the
PCA new impetus with an internal review of relations
with Russia embodied in the “Common Strategy,”
adopted by the European Council in June 1999.50 In lofty
language, the Common Strategy reiterates Europe’s
vision for Russia:
A stable, democratic and prosperous Russia, firmly
anchored in a united Europe free of new dividing lines,
is essential to lasting peace on the continent [emphasis
added]. The issues which the whole continent faces
can be resolved only through ever closer cooperation
between Russia and the European Union. The EU
welcomes Russia’s return to its rightful place in the
European family in a spirit of friendship, cooperation,
fair accommodation of interests and on the foundations
of shared values enshrined in the common heritage of
European civilization.

Such grandiloquent rhetoric and bold ambitions,
however, masked the absence of a viable European
strategy connecting desired goals with the necessary
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means to realize them. In its place, the document
outlines some sensible narrower objectives, such as
promoting cooperation in areas concerning European
security (including peacekeeping missions within the
so-called Petersburg tasks), international crime, and
the environment. However, the Common Strategy
leaves unresolved the persistent contradiction over
whether any practical results from partnership can be
achieved before Russia is transformed, or even if the
partnership should actively foster domestic reforms in
Russia as a first priority.
The bulk of the Common Strategy is devoted to
several pages of detailed instructions and advice for
the dwindling number of reformers still remaining in
the Russian government in the late 1990s. Described
by a European minister as “long and diffuse,” the
Common Strategy failed to “clearly signal what
the EU’s specific priorities are in its relations with
Russia.”51 Such incoherence no doubt reflected the
start-up difficulties stemming from the launch of
the CFSP’s new mechanisms as well as the EU’s
cumbersome bureaucratic process which incorporates
the disparate input of many member states.52 But at
root, it demonstrates a lack of political will.
Looking back on the Common Strategy and similar
pronouncements from Brussels, the EU’s lengthy list of
recommended reforms seems a pompous substitute for
a concrete plan to operationalize strong positive and
negative incentives to anchor Russia. At the time it was
clear already that Russia’s transformation would not
be achieved with the kind of technical initiatives and
financial assistance arranged through the Technical
Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
(TACIS) and other programs. Europe had honed its
stick of extensive conditionality requirements and
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possessed commanding market power, but in Russia’s
case (as with other non-Baltic former Soviet republics),
it refused to proffer the huge stimulus that might have
made a difference—the promise of accession.
As discussed above, the realistic potential of EU
accession has a significant influence on the design of
new political, economic, and regulatory institutions
in transition countries and the scope of domestic
adjustment, which in turn affects the dynamics
supporting successful consolidation. In particular,
the EU is able to empower reformist politicians by
rewarding their efforts with aid, trade, and political ties.
When domestic conditions are favorable, supportive
external conditions can “create a domino effect.”53
On the other hand, a weak signal for membership
prospects may reinforce weak domestic incentives
to reform political and economic structures and vice
versa, creating a “vicious cycle” of outcomes instead of
the positive reinforcing “virtuous circle” of reforms.
Because differences in the structure of international
incentives affect domestic political fortunes, such
settings are especially conducive to ethnic nationalism
and politically-inspired opposition. As Paul Kubicek
observes, EU “membership may be great for the
country, but would the required political reforms
be good for the existing leadership?”54 For instance,
politicians consumed by a struggle to control and
distribute astronomical rents from high energy
prices and who engage in excessive patronage and
more nefarious activities stand to lose from greater
transparency and secure property rights. Such leaders
are strongly motivated to mask their political and
personal interests by appealing to voters on more
noble grounds of protecting national autonomy and
sovereignty from the application of “double standards”
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and other “unfair” demands.55 Thus in Russia, where
senior officials simultaneously hold top positions in
key national firms or reap other financial rewards
from their positions of authority, warnings abound
about supposed threats to Russia’s sovereignty from
foreign multinationals pushing for transparent, stable
rules for foreign investment in strategic industries
such as oil and gas. A similar line is evident about
democratic breakthroughs from “color revolutions”
in which outsiders working with domestically based
nongovernment organizations (NGOs) declare the
government ineffective and supposedly provoke
internal conflicts which challenge the nation’s security
or its geopolitical position in regions of vital interest.56
According to the President’s deputy chief of staff
and chief political strategist, Russia must resist such
“invasions” by controlling its own leading sectors of
the economy and thereby “carve out a place in the
global hierarchy. . . . Our sovereignty and who we are
in the world’s spider web—spiders or flies—depends
on this.”57 Likewise, distorted images of outsiders
provoking political instability during color revolutions
are largely a convenient justification for additional
authoritarian controls and repressive measures such
as the recent backlash in Russia against NGOs and
legislation constraining their activities.58
However, a strong EU commitment, coupled with
credible threats to use the stick of conditionality, may
tilt the balance in favor of reformers and even convince
Western-oriented voters to change leaders who are
responsible for regressive policies. This effect assumes
that liberal reformers already exist in some numbers
to create a “beachhead” from which democracy can
be advanced.59 Thus, threats by Brussels to postpone
consideration of membership in Slovakia under
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Vladimir Méciar had a positive effect, exposing the
emptiness of Méciar’s claims that Brussels resorted
to double standards. The real cost of supporting a
government which refused all manner of accountability
while pretending to work toward the goal of EU
accession was revealed to Slovak citizens.60 Similarly,
in Romania, Bulgaria, and especially in Turkey, the
EU initially proved to be a weak anchor in stimulating
radical domestic change in the absence of clear
prospects for membership. However, the authentic
prospect of membership, for example in Turkey after
1999, provided a common sense of purpose to an
inchoate pro-EU coalition and hastened a wave of
liberal reforms.61
It remains to be seen whether the EU will offer
encouragement to Ukraine which, like Slovakia, only
rhetorically espoused a pro-European choice under
President Leonid Kuchma, while adopting policies that
undermined the goal of EU membership.62 During the
Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko emphasized
a commitment to substantive reforms and appealed
to Brussels for a strong signal that membership was
possible, invoking the EU’s 1998 precedent in taking
a “clear European position that helped the democratic
forces in Slovakia defeat an authoritarian regime.”63
Russia, although in theory eligible to apply for
membership as a European state,64 is even more of an
outlier, not least because of its increasingly authoritarian measures. Strobe Talbott, President Bill Clinton’s
deputy secretary of state and a distinguished Russia
expert, considers Russia as “beyond the gravitational
pull of the EU’s political values and norms.”65 Against one
set of indicators for successful democratic convergence
or democracy through use of conditionality,66 Russia
indeed would fall short on many conditions. These
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include the prevalence of nationalist temptations, a
weak civil society coupled with entrenched elites, no
readily available sticks or carrots to induce reform,
ambivalent attitudes towards membership, and
alternatives to the EU in the form of both “special
relationships” and countervailing coalitions in the CIS
and Eurasia of like-minded authoritarian regimes. To
be sure, international leverage and inducements have
been absent from the outset because Brussels made
clear that Russian accession is out of the question.
In 2002, then European Commission President
Romano Prodi stated publicly that former Soviet
republics have no place in an enlarged EU. When on
a visit to Brussels Putin had inquired about potential
Russian membership, Prodi recounted how he told
him that Russia is just “too big” to join.67 The EU
plainly is concerned more with the size of Russia’s
large, albeit fast shrinking, population (presently
double the size of Turkey’s current but growing
population) which would be difficult to absorb, than
with its vast geographic expanse. Were Russia ever
to become a serious candidate for membership in the
EU, institutional changes would be expected in voting
rights and structural funds to protect existing members’
privileges to a large degree. Russia’s nuclear stockpile
and great power ego are added annoyances, but it is
unlikely that Russia’s GDP is a disabling factor since it
is roughly equivalent to the combined GDPs of the 10
new members and only a fraction of the truly big EU
output.
It is beyond the scope of this monograph to
speculate in greater detail about hypothetical Russian
accession in view of the many obvious impediments
to further EU enlargement, including concerns over
financial transfers, voting rights, collective action
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problems, the relative distribution of economic gains
and losses, and enlargement fatigue. Suffice it to
suggest first that accession is a key element of a viable
transformation model, even for “hard cases” such as
Slovakia and Turkey. Second, the EU accession model
was and perhaps remains an important counterfactual
alternative for still more challenging cases, such as
Russia and Ukraine, where illiberal pluralist states have
degenerated into corrupt oligarchies or competitive
authoritarian regimes in which elections are rigged,
information is constrained, NGOs are repressed, and
partially reformed economies are captured by powerful
vested interests or ruling “syndicates.”68 There is no
prior empirical record to estimate the probability of
successfully dislodging a country caught in the partial
reform trap. Certainly, Turkey’s experience of halting
reforms over 2 decades punctuated by the fortuitous
alignment of internal and international stimuli is
a reminder that timing matters, and that stagnant
progress over a long period does not necessarily lead
to irreversible failure.
At the same time, it should be emphasized that
in sharp contrast to the positive effects derived from
anchoring post-communist transition countries in
Europe, nonmembership partner agreements of the
sort negotiated with Russia and Ukraine have been
widely dismissed as being too weak to affect the
general direction of policy.69 As the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) observed,
“In the absence of prospects for closer integration, EU
association agreements have not exercised significant
influence on the reform process in the CIS.”70
After the Orange Revolution, Brussels agreed to a
10-point plan of “additional measures to further
strengthen and enrich” the Action Plan negotiated be-
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tween the EU and the Kuchma regime in 2005 before the
presidential elections. Although these measures have
been criticized as a tepid response to the democratic
breakthrough in Ukraine, one element of the plan
called for shifting half of total funding available to
CIS members from the European Investment Bank to
Ukraine, principally at the expense of Russia, then the
only CIS country to receive such loans.71 Also notable is
that the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) bilateral
Action Plans, such as the one for Ukraine, are meant
to “encourage and support . . . further integration
into European economic and social structures” short
of recognizing any participant’s aspirations for full
membership.72 Each Action Plan is designed to meet
the interests of the participant for deeper cooperation
in specific areas, although all involve conditionality as
well as positive support (financial assistance, technical
dialogue, or transfer of best practice) as progress is
made. For some, deeper cooperation within ENP would
involve a stake in the EU’s internal market, moving
from “‘shallow’ integration to deeper economic and
regulatory integration.”73
Such steps resemble elements of the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) and could lead to
associations with the EU that resemble Norway’s
status, recognizing that such nonmembers lack voting
rights over regulations that govern their behavior and
they have negotiated multiple separate arrangements
in diverse issue areas. Norway and other associate nonEU members, of course, were already well-established
market democracies when such arrangements were
put in place. Given such noteworthy differences as well
as the changing dynamics of domestic and regional
politics, it is premature to predict the potential impact
of the new ENP Action Plans on the domestic policy

31

choices of transitional countries such as Ukraine and
Moldova.
At its own request, Russia is not a participant in
the ENP. Yet the EU’s Common Strategy and the PCA
underscore a persistent, unresolved contradiction in
Europe’s approach—partnership leads to shallow
agreements which solve some practical problems and
create an illusion that Russia is not excluded, but there
is no convincing evidence that a special relationship
will bring about the desired liberal transformation.
So long as an accession strategy for Russia is ruled
out as unwarranted, too costly, and too risky, the EU
will likely continue to settle for a second-best, limited
liability solution of special relationships, hoping
Russia will gradually adapt to European norms while
avoiding worse outcomes.
Russia’s Approach to Partnership:
Underlying Commitment Problems.
Russia’s reaction to the EU’s 1999 Common Strategy
reflected the changed domestic and international
context which featured culminating political chaos
associated with the derailing of reforms under Yeltsin,
deflated hopes for post-Cold War harmony, acrimony
over NATO’s use of force in the Balkans and expansion
eastward, and the ascendancy of Yevgenny Primakov
from the intelligence service to foreign minister and
then prime minister. Primakov’s anti-Western and
especially anti-American attitudes and vision of a
multipolar world were shared widely by vast swaths
of unreconstructed Soviet-era functionaries still pushing their ideological predispositions and parochial
interests in the corridors of power, particularly in the
ministries of foreign affairs and defense. Competition
over strategic and ideological visions was exacerbated
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by the continued absence of strong domestic political
institutions, rendering Russia’s international commitments as uncertain and lacking in credibility as its
domestic commitments were to private firms and
societal groups. However, beyond trade disputes,
Brussels was not on Russia’s primary radar scope until
the EU moved decisively in favor of its own expansion
and began to develop independent foreign and defense
policies.74
Moscow responded dismissively to the Common
Strategy with a strategy statement of its own and then
Prime Minister Putin presented it to the EU in October
1999.75 Where the European grandees prefer to speak
of common values and convergence to European
norms (and leave discussion of their enormous market
power and use of sanctions to less polite settings), the
Russians emphasize geopolitics, great power interests,
and the instrumental bases of cooperation. It follows
that “The Medium Term Strategy for the Development
of Relations between the Russian Federation and the
EU (2000-2010)” sees no need to link the development
of the EU-Russia “strategic partnership” to democratic
reforms in Russia or common values. Rather, cooperation should be established on an equal basis and with
full respect of Russia’s sovereignty. The strategy refers
to “the objective need to establish a multipolar world”
and to ensure cooperation in European security to
“counterbalance, inter alia, the NATO–centrism in
Europe.” That the Russian statement also mentions
developing contacts with the West European Union
(WEU) raises questions about the competence of the
foreign ministry in the 1990s which should have known
that the WEU was soon to be disbanded.
Further, the strategy is aimed at “enhancing the role
and image of Russia in Europe and in the world” and
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“mobilizing the economic potential and managerial
experience of the EU to promote the development of
a socially oriented market economy” in Russia. The
strategy also pressed for EU recognition of Russia as
a market economy, which was subsequently granted
in 2002. This achievement makes it more difficult for
Brussels to apply various import restrictions and antidumping procedures against such Russian exports as
steel, textiles, nuclear fuel, and space technologies. Still,
the strategy asserted Russia’s prerogative to protect
key economic sectors, notwithstanding the terms of
the PCA or bilateral negotiations on accession to the
WTO which Russia finally concluded with Brussels in
May 2004.
The Russian government does not anticipate
accession to the EU during the 10 years under review,
according to the strategy document, which echoes
Putin’s studied refusal to rule out Russia’s membership
as a future option. The strategy paper then goes on to
insist on Russia’s special status: “As a world power
situated on two continents, Russia should retain its
freedom to determine and implement its domestic
and foreign policies, its status and advantages of a
Euro-Asian state and the largest country of the CIS,
[the] independence of its position and activities at
international organizations.” The document similarly
foreshadows Russia’s tension between deepening
cooperation with the West and developing a counter
“system of interstate political and economic relations
in the CIS” with Moscow at the center. Such ambiguity
over preferences is another principal source of the
suboptimal special relationships and impediment to
deeper cooperation and integration between Russia
and the EU.
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Russia-EU Partnership under Putin:
Tactical Success and Strategic Stalemate.
Putin’s ascendance to the position of president in
2000 breathed new life into Russia’s strained relationship with the EU. But it also intensified Russia’s commitment problems and the contradictions in Russia’s
developing “multi-vector” foreign policy,76 signaling
continued ambivalence about integration with
Europe. Putin’s economic modernization program—
which features selective liberal economic reforms,
the promotion of high growth, national control
over strategic sectors, particularly energy, and the
stabilization of Russian politics—was initially coupled
with a charm offensive abroad and willingness to stand
with the United States after September 11, 2001 (9/11),
and with France and Germany against the war in Iraq,
raising expectations about a fundamental reorientation
of Russian foreign policy towards the West.77 However,
at root, Putin’s strategy aims to restore Russia’s
power and position, not to forge an alliance based on
common values, as Alexander Vershbow, then the
U.S. ambassador in Moscow was among the first to
discern.
President Putin invokes his country’s “Western
vocation” and refers often to Russia as “a European
country” which has special relations with Europe’s
major powers and seeks “to strengthen . . . interaction
with the EU as a whole.”78 Key government officials,
and at least one of the potential successors to Putin,
find it expedient to echo this sense of national identity.
Thus, First Deputy Prime Minister and Gazprom
Chairman Dmitri Medvedev stated matter-of-factly at
a gathering of international business leaders, “Russia
is a part of Europe and European civilization, and that
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is that.”79 Yet the Russian president acknowledged in
his 2001 address at the German Bundestag that “We
continue to live in the old system of values. We speak
of a partnership, but, in reality, we still have not yet
learnt to trust one another.” In clear German, Putin
added, “Despite all the sweet talk, we secretly still
resist.”
In 2001, Russia still was positioned too weakly
to bargain for better terms in its fledgling special
relationships with the EU, NATO, and G-8. Frustrated
by this situation, Putin complained to the German
parliamentarians:
Despite all the positive things that have been achieved
over the past decades, we have not yet managed to
work out an efficient mechanism for cooperation. The
coordination organs, which have been established so far,
do not give Russia any real opportunity to participate
in the preparation of decisions. Nowadays, decisions are
sometimes made without [consulting] us at all, and then
we are emphatically asked to approve them.80

In 2002, the Kremlin succeeded in gaining market
economy status for Russia from both Washington
and Brussels, but this was largely a political gesture.
Putin was still unable to press European officials into
meaningful concessions in other areas, such as over
Russia’s open transit rights to Kaliningrad, its enclave
in EU territory.
Moscow expected that improvements in its
economic and political conditions would translate
into greater leverage in its dealings with the EU and
other Western actors. In fact, Russia consistently has
exceeded growth expectations since the 1998 financial
crisis, with an average rate slightly above 6.5 percent
per annum in 1999-2003.81 However, it was large price
rises in oil and a monopoly grip on gas distribution
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to Europe that solidified Moscow’s perception in 2005
of its strengthened bargaining position as an indispensable energy great power.82 Putin had earlier brought
greater stability to Russian politics and, using a clear
majority in the parliament, was able to enact select
efficiency-enhancing policy changes. However, the
president’s moves to centralize power in the Kremlin
and the state and an increase in chekisty (former
KGB) cronies from St. Petersburg and other siloviki83
supporters from the military and security services84 at
the expense of private business and civil society raised
doubts about the credibility of Russia’s commitment to
market reforms and property rights, let alone to what
Putin referred to as “managed democracy.”
Political polarization has diminished under
Putin, but it comes at the price of the parliamentary
electoral defeat and discrediting of liberals with a proEuropean orientation.85 Meanwhile the centralization
of power in the Kremlin has led to sharp reversals in
the level of political openness.86 The assault on Yukos
and its chairman, Mikhail Khodorkovskii, further
demonstrated that “Putin wants dynamic capitalist
development without having to deal with the political
power of a dynamic capitalist class.”87 In fact, the fusion
of state and business under Putin, with top officials in the
Kremlin also holding senior executive posts in leading
firms, has given new meaning to state capture and led
to a notable worsening of corruption and racketeering
in the administrative structure, as well as a decrease
in transparency.88 The current autocratic rulers in the
Kremlin, like monopolists, are likely to block socially
beneficial economic and political reforms when they
threaten their political power. Absent institutions
holding them accountable, ruling elites typically are
unwilling to forego further redistributions of wealth, as
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in Russia where high political office is now the surest
path to phenomenal riches.89
In these circumstances, Europeans have not
been reticent to raise “questions about Russia’s
commitment and ability to uphold core universal and
European values and pursue democratic reforms.”
Such concerns surface repeatedly and permeated an
internal assessment of EU-Russia relations presented
to the Council and European Parliament in February
2004.90 The communication reiterated the main goal of
engagement—to “promote a fully functioning rulesbased system in Russia.” It went on to insist that
the EU “as a whole” (warning against troublesome
freelancing by leaders of certain member states, such
as Italy’s President Silvio Berlusconi) “should confirm
that European values remain the basis for deepening
relations.” Brussels intended to send another clear
message to Moscow about what was required to build
a “strategic partnership.”
Thus, despite a brief period of euphoria after
September 11, 2001 (9/11) and a spectacular rise in
economic growth, Russia’s relations with the West and
the EU in particular have rankled from lack of vision
and mutual distrust. With Brussels, Moscow has made
an effort to play its cards with greater skill but still has
had only mixed luck and nothing remotely equivalent
to a royal flush. Staking out a firmer bargaining position,
Russia successfully insisted on separating itself from
the ENP and asserting its “special” importance in
relations with the EU. At the St. Petersburg summit in
May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to develop their
plan for Four Common Spaces, and in recent years
Moscow has pushed hard to get its priorities specified
on separate road maps for this initiative instead of the
one action plan envisioned by the EU.
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The Long and Winding Road to Nebulous
Common Spaces.
It was hoped that with the Four Common Spaces
initiative Moscow finally would be able to develop
more equal relations with Brussels and escape from
the position of demandeur—with respect to WTO, trade
disputes, the transit of people and goods to and from
Kaliningrad, visa requirements for Russians traveling
within the Schengen zone, extension of the PCA to
new members, and so on. To this end, Russia has been
keen to develop the institutional structure of the EURussia relationship and extracted minor concessions
from Brussels on process and procedural matters.
For example, in June 2003 the EU-Russia Permanent
Partnership Council (PPC) was established to replace
the Cooperation Council whose task was to oversee
the implementation of the PCA. The PPC is a body at
the ministerial level which was designed to be flexible
and permit meetings in different formats as often as
necessary, bringing together relevant ministers to
discuss specific issues. To date, PPCs have been held
in the format of foreign ministers, justice and home
affairs ministers, and energy ministers. Russia and the
EU also hold regular biannual summits, and on two
occasions the EU has been represented by all its heads
of state and government, not just the usual troika of
officials from the EU Member State that holds the EU
Presidency (and possibly the incoming EU Presidency),
the European Commission, and the EU Council
Secretariat. Dialogue between the EU and Russia, in
fact, is now more frequent than between Brussels and
any other actor.91
With respect to the ESDP, a high priority area
for Moscow,92 the two sides agreed to frequent

39

consultations, including monthly meetings between the
Russian ambassador in Brussels and the EU’s Political
and Security Committee (COPS) and the assignment
of a Russian officer as liaison to the EU Military
Staff in Brussels. Moscow now proposes biweekly
meetings and also regular sessions on terrorism issues
and greater participation of the Russian Ministry
of Defense in partnership activities.93 Although
discussions in this area are more extensive with Russia
than with ENP countries, Moscow remains concerned
about being sidelined on a host of European security
issues within the EU’s domain. The irony, not lost on
officials in the corridors of the defense ministry, is
that Russia’s partnership with NATO is not only more
institutionalized, as in the Russia-NATO Council, but
also more advanced with respect to development of
multiple avenues of cooperation, such as procedures
for interoperability and joint operations.94 Neither
Russia nor the EU views the other as a military threat,
but neither do they see their relationship as a means
to solve existing security requirements, which further
decreases the likelihood of deepening cooperation.95
Expanded dialogue thus has proved to be no
substitute for substantive results, and, as Putin’s
first term came to a close, there were few notable
achievements from the EU-Russia partnership to
trumpet. In a July 2004 speech to Russian diplomats
at the foreign ministry where anti-Western attitudes
still run deep, President Putin nonetheless pointedly
insisted that, after the CIS, “Europe remains our
traditional priority.” He explained, “The latest wave
of EU and NATO enlargement has created a new
geopolitical situation on the continent, and now we
must not so much adapt to it as, first of all, minimize
the potential risks and damage to Russia’s economic
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security and economic interests, and, second of all,
find some opportunities here and use them to good
effect. There is no other option left to us but to build up
equal cooperation with the EU and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.”96 There is no mistaking Putin’s
defensive tone or the widespread skepticism he faces
about achieving tangible results from cooperation with
an expanding EU.
The lack of significant progress is visible most
readily in the once vaunted development of the four
Common Spaces. For example, in the Common Space
on freedom, security, and justice, Moscow insisted
on including discussion of visa-free travel within the
Schengen zone which now prevents Russians from
traveling freely in the 25 member states of the EU,
let alone to and from Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave
which is entirely within the EU. The road map for
this space agreed to at the Moscow summit in May
2005 underscores the objective of “building a new
Europe without dividing lines” and joint agreement
to examine the “conditions for visa-free travel,”
but only over the long term.97 Cooperation also is
envisioned in combating terrorism, international
crime, and drug trafficking, with mechanisms for
interagency coordination, although it remains unclear
how the parties will surmount problems of secrecy and
bureaucratic corruption in Russia.
At the 2006 Summit in Sochi, the two sides reached
a limited agreement that made minor changes to the
rules for issuing visas, simplifying procedures for
certain categories of citizens on both sides, such as
students, journalists, businessmen, cultural activists,
scientists, and athletes. Putin heralded the “new” visa
regulations as the first step toward eventual visa-free
travel,98 putting a positive spin on the meeting, just 2
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months before Russia’s first hosting of a G-8 summit
in St. Petersburg. However, such happy talk could
not mask the usual outcome of shallow cooperation
or Russia’s concession on the corollary “readmission
agreement” which commits Moscow to accept back
any person who illegally enters the EU from Russia.
The road map for the Common Economic Space
is supposed to build on previously agreed goals
for the establishment of a single economic space,
linking it to both Russian membership in the WTO,
further liberalization of the Russian economy, and
the application of principles embodied in the PCA
to economic relations. However, the road map is less
precise than the PCA about progress toward a free trade
area and leaves open whose standards—EU norms,
international or Russian—will govern legislative and
regulatory convergence. This uncertainty may reflect
Russia’s preference for equal partnership in lieu of
EU normative dominance, or it may be a “costly
standoff” in the bargaining over trade relations. The
EU’s dominant market power usually ensures that
its rules prevail in such relationships, as is the case
in the Action Plans and other arrangements for ENP
countries. Although still at an elementary stage, those
arrangements resemble the European Economic Area
(EEA) which gives non-EU members, such as Norway
and Iceland, full access to the EU single market in
return for their implementation of the acquis in most
areas.
Russian economists already have raised concerns
about the desirability of adopting all or most of the
acquis, pointing especially to inflexibilities from
over-regulation and the high costs of the EU’s social
welfare norms, which are impediments to economic
growth.99 Unilateral adoption by Russia of the acquis
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and integration without membership in the EU would
mean having no voice in shaping European rules and
no effective legal protection in conflicts against the
EU. Such a relationship may work for Norway and
Switzerland (although former EEA members Austria,
Finland, and Sweden ultimately opted to apply for
membership), but it is doubtful that a large power
sensitive about its position, such as Russia, would
embrace it willingly.100 Many Russian elites dismiss the
notion as a nonstarter,101 although President Putin has
made at least one positive reference to the Norwegian
model. Given that EU regulations would help lock-in
improved rules in a number of areas such as competition
policy and lead to increased foreign direct investment
(FDI), it is evident that some opposition to nonmember
integration comes from Russia’s protectionist industrial
lobbies and the Kremlin. Perhaps as important, there
are strong sentiments in the Russian political class that
Brussels should abandon its expectation that Russia
adopt even a “light” version of EU laws and standards.
In this view, it is better to use available international or
jointly negotiated standards as a basis for integration
wherever possible to bring about open markets and the
free movement of people, goods, services, and capital
than to get bogged down by excessively bureaucratic
plans for “harmonization.”102 The Russian emphasis
on equality in relations in all aspects of possible
integration, however, rests on the false assumption
that a group of rule-governed market democracies
would ever integrate willingly with an illiberal corrupt
autocracy caught in a partial reform trap. The default
compromises, given such contradictions, therefore
will likely remain within the existing pattern of special
relationships.
Of all the Common Spaces, Russians and Europeans
alike have viewed the potential for equal partnership as
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most promising within the context of External Security
or ESDP. The two sides have definable common security
interests with respect to terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation, and also,
from the Russian perspective, security has the added
benefit of being an area of comparative advantage.103
Underappreciated, however, was the extent to which
Russia’s underlying commitment problems would
undermine progress even in an area where Europe
could benefit from Russian capabilities. Thus, instead
of taking up a Russian offer to fill Europe’s need for a
strategic airlift capability, Europeans opted to develop
their own new aircraft. Similarly, Russia may be invited
to participate in EU crisis management operations and
be involved in managing the mission if it contributes
significant capabilities. However, Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov complains that the “old approach” in
which the EU leads and Russia follows is not suitable
for an equal strategic partnership. Moscow appreciates
that the EU may assume a leading role on many
European security issues but wants to share the driver’s
seat, according to Lavrov, proposing operations that
will be implemented jointly.104 Russia is motivated
partly by an interest in preventing another Kosovo or
a future EU intervention in border areas where there is
considerable friction between the two sides. One such
hot-spot is Moldova, where the EU in November 2003
undercut a Russian initiative to end the dispute over
Transdnistria on terms that legitimated a long-term
Russian military presence in the region.
The road map for the Common Space of External
Security notes that the two parties intend to cooperate
to promote the resolution of so-called frozen conflicts
(e.g., in Transdnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
and Nagorno-Karabakh), in line with UN and
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OSCE commitments, given Russia’s sensitivity to
retrenchment from the former Soviet space. Although
Russia fears more situations like the 2004 Orange
Revolution and exaggerates Western involvement,
Moscow is coming to appreciate that not all proWestern, pro-EU orientations are necessarily antiRussian.105 What is unclear is whether Moscow sees
sufficient common interests and is willing to share the
driver’s seat with Brussels in settling conflicts along
their common frontier.106 Russia has been a party to
these post-Soviet disputes which involve sensitive
questions about sovereignty, separatist groups, and
Russia’s future influence. In May 2006, Russia agreed to
new international negotiations on turning the Russian
“peacekeeping” contingent in Moldova into an authentic international operation including personnel from
EU members and elements of the Polish-Ukrainian joint
peacekeeping battalion. But Moscow has yet to give up
its insistence on a prior political settlement between
Chisinau and Tiraspol, which is a cover for legitimizing
Moscow’s role as meddler in the conflict and ensuring
Russian military presence indefinitely.107 Meanwhile
in June the OSCE Chairman demanded that Russia
finally honor the 1999 OSCE accord and withdraw
its troops from the territories of both Moldova and
Georgia, even offering to pay for Russia’s withdrawal
from Transdnistria. The Russian Foreign Ministry,
however, has shifted to a harder line, announcing that
the breakaway entities in these former Soviet republics
are entitled to self-determination, not unlike Kosovo
and Montenegro, despite the challenge to international
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.108 If
Moscow is capitalizing on its stronger position to lay
claim to exclusive prerogatives in its borderlands, this
policy will seriously strain Russia’s special relationship
with the EU.
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With the admission of Romania to the EU in 2007 and
the expansion of ENP programs, such developments
will test whether Brussels has sufficient political will
and strategic vision to promote settlements of frozen
conflicts which reflect the values and interests that
it wants to project in the new border areas it shares
with Russia. It is premature to predict with confidence
whether Europe and Russia will emphasize competing
stakes in their common neighborhood, let problems
fester, or find common ground to develop workable
solutions. The “special relationship” equilibrium
suggests the probability of continued stalemate or
limited and shallow agreements, but, understandably,
this is not how political leaders prefer to characterize
the “special” nature and importance of this partnership
or its achievements.
Taking 2005 as an important turning point for
Russia’s role in the world arena (and a new high
point for recent oil prices), government officials in the
Putin administration were prone to exaggerate the
achievements and significance of the 15th EU-Russia
summit held in Moscow that May and the development
of the road maps for the Four Common Spaces. Foreign
Minister Lavrov boasted of the changed conditions in
which Russia and the EU negotiated, insisting that
Russia will no longer condescend to being “an object
of the EU’s policy.” As late as the Russia-EU summit
in February 1999, Lavrov conceded, “the entire agenda
was . . . interspersed with issues concerning measures
to stabilize the economic and social conditions in
Russia, international assistance to these measures, the
maintenance of trade dynamics, and the attraction
of direct investment, technical assistance, and
humanitarian aid.” By comparison, “if we compare
the February 1999 agenda with the themes of the two
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summit meetings which took place this year [in 2005],
then, of course, striking changes have occurred.”109
The Russian Foreign Minister could reasonably point
to a strengthening of Russia’s economic conditions and
its growing influence on energy matters (discussed
below). At the October 2005 EU-Russia Summit held
in London, President Putin underscored Russia’s new
confidence, given sustained high economic growth and
dominance in energy. He recalled with gratitude how
serious European politicians had not “humiliated”
Russia when it suffered from economic decline and
weak state capacity, asserting that Moscow would
reciprocate now that “our possibilities have increased
considerably.” But he underscored that the dialog and
partnership would now be “equal.”110
Thus, bowing to Moscow’s insistence, the EU
and Russia launched in March 2005 a new round of
consultations which was tasked with examining
human rights not only in Russia, including Chechnya,
but also in the EU, focusing on minorities, in particular
Russian-speaking minorities living in the Baltic States.
In line with Moscow’s more assertive stance, Russia
no longer would act as if the admission of post-Soviet
countries to the EU and NATO signified that they were
no longer an area of Russian national interest. The
Baltic states, in particular, would be targeted as areas
of concern on issues such as transit or the status of the
Russian language and Russian community.111 To the
extent that Moscow could successfully tilt the agenda
for discussions with the EU in favor of such issues, it
expected to gain an advantage in the distribution of
benefits from the relationship. That Russia’s focus
primarily was instrumental cannot be doubted, given
its own record of double standards on human rights
issues. Moreover, since the 1990s, Russia actively
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had engaged in economic penetration and pursued
partners and influence in Central and Eastern Europe,
especially exploiting energy dependent, indebted weak
links, such as Slovakia under Meciar, while ignoring
Western and international criticism of Slovakia’s
discriminatory policies toward its large Hungarian
and Roma minorities.112
It would be an exaggeration to claim that progress
on the road maps had reached a high point or that they
clearly indicate where the EU and Russia are heading,
let alone whether these indistinct destinations will
ever be reached. Prime Minister Tony Blair engaged
in diplomatic hyperbole at the conclusion of the EURussia summit in London in 2005 when he speculated
that “the new institutional arrangements that will
supersede the present Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement are likely to see a significant institutional
strengthening of the relationship between Europe and
Russia for the future.”113 More accurately, as one analyst
concluded, the EU has a “well-identified corpus of law,
norms and values. But it does not have a well-defined
model for exporting these beyond suggesting weak and
fuzzy derivatives of the enlargement process. . . .”114
This is the dilemma of special relationships; they
tend to produce second-best or shallow preliminary
agreements. Not even growing economic and energy
interdependence is encouraging Brussels or Moscow
to rethink the current paradigm in favor of a deeper
commitment to more substantial arrangements.
Economic Asymmetries and Energy
Interdependence.
Russia and the EU are very unequal partners and
large economic asymmetries create an imbalance of
power which greatly weakens Russia’s bargaining
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position in every area except energy, where there is
mutual interdependence and growing tensions. The EU
population is now over 457 million after enlargement
(EU-25) compared to less than 143 million Russians,
a number which is declining steadily.115 Russia’s real
GDP (PPP) is only 12 percent of the EU total in 2004
(up from 10.5 percent in 2001) and only 6 percent larger
than that of the 10 new members (EU-10) combined.
The enlarged Europe is Russia’s main trading partner,
absorbing 50 percent of Russia’s exports. However,
Russia is a relatively small trading partner for the EU,
accounting for only about 5 percent of total EU foreign
trade, just ahead of the level of EU transactions with
Norway. EU-Russia trade more than doubled between
1995 and 2003 but again the structure of trade is
unbalanced. In 2004, energy and fuels accounted for
about 59 percent of Russian exports to the EU while
Europe exports mostly manufactured goods to Russia
(see Table 1 for data and comparisons with recent
[Poland], new [Romania and Bulgaria], and aspiring
[Turkey and Ukraine] EU members).116
With surging energy prices but stagnant domestic
production, Russia seeks to create economic and political advantages by encouraging greater competition
among buyers for Russian energy and higher European
dependencies on Russia as its principal supplier of gas.
At present, Europe relies on Russia for 30 percent of
its oil imports (or 25 percent of oil consumption) and
50 percent of its natural gas imports (or 25 percent of
gas consumption), including gas from Central Asia
sent through Russian pipelines (see Figures 1, 2, and
3). Overall, members of the EU import 50 percent of
total energy supplies, and forecasts suggest imports
will rise to 70 percent and natural gas consumption to
80 percent by 2030.
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Population GDP US$
(mil)
Billions

GDP
GDP
3DP/capita
with PPP with PPP percentage
of
Billions
US$
agriculture

GDP/
capita
US$

Russia

142.8*

581.8

4,086.6

1,449.2

10,179.5

5*

Poland

38.2

242.2

6,344.0

475.4

12,451.0

3.07

Turkey

70.7

302.6

4,286.2

529.6

7,503.0

11.9

Ukraine

48.0*

65.0

13,65.7

312.1

6,554.3

13.66

Romania

21.7

71.3

3,206.6

170.7

7,641.5

12.84

Bulgaria

7.8

23.8

3,056.4

66.1

8,499.8

10

EU-25

457.2

12,864.0*

28,136.0*

12,111.0*

26,488.0*

EU-15

383.0

12,279.0*

32,019.0*

11,104.0*

28,955.0*

EU-10

74.3

585.0*

7,938.0*

1,007.0*

13,653.0*

* From
World
Bank.org

* From
www.
eiu.com
Country
Forecast

* From
www.
eiu.com
Country
Forecast

* From
www.
eiu.com
Country
Forecast

* From
www.
eiu.com
Country
Forecast

2.2*

* From
CIA World
Factbook
(2005
estimate)

Source: Population from Eurostat
GDP, GDP/capita, GDP with PPP, and GDP/capita with PPP
from IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database
GDP% agriculture from WorldBank.org

Table 1. Comparative Economic Data for Current,
New and Potential EU Members.
Russia

Energy sector contribution to GDP
Oil Exports to the EU-25
Gas exports to the EU-25

approximately 25%
63% of oil exported
65% of gas exported

EU-25

Oil Exports from Russia
Gas exports

30%
50%

Source: European Commission, 2004.

Figure 1. EU-Russia Energy Relations.
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Russia (30%)
Other (34%)
Norway (18%)
Saudi Arabia (10%)
Libya (8%)

Russia (50%)
Algeria (23%)
Norway (22%)
Others (5%)

Figure 2. EU-25 Energy Imports: Origins.
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Source: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Energy Information
Administration (EIA), Country Analysis Briefs, Russia, “Natural
Gas,” January 2006, available at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/
NaturalGas.html.

Figure 3. Existing and Planned Natural Gas
Pipelines to Europe.
Unlike oil, the market in natural gas depends
more on long-term supply agreements, such as those
between the energy-poor but technology/capital-rich
West European countries and the energy-rich but
technology/capital-constrained economies of Russia
and Central Asia. In the 1990s the EU attempted to
reconcile the contradictions between competitive
markets and long-term producer-consumer supply
agreements with the Energy Charter Treaty which aims
52

to provide certainty and protection for energy trade,
transit, and investment, and open Russia’s domestic
energy market to competition, reflecting Europe’s stake
in securing reliable supplies on favorable commercial
conditions.117 Moscow has refused to ratify the charter,
however, insisting that its unequal terms favor energy
consumers over suppliers and that “energy security”
should be defined not only in terms of supply but also
as security of demand and acceptable prices for energy
suppliers.118
Likewise Russia remains unwilling to agree to
greater transparency and nondiscriminatory rules for
all participants. Despite President Putin’s assurances
at the May 2006 EU-Russia Summit in Sochi that
Moscow is prepared to allow Europeans access to the
Russian economy’s “holiest of holies, the energy area,”
if they take “reciprocal steps,” any transit protocol
on pipelines is likely to be limited or unreachable,
given Moscow’s aversion to relinquishing its huge
advantages from national ownership or command over
the dispatch, transport, and storage infrastructure for
natural gas.119 Moreover, given huge price differentials,
Gazprom’s control over pipeline access and monopoly
on CIS exports adds rents to its market power as well
as an incentive to discriminate among independent
producers. For example, Turkmenistan sells gas
to Russia at the cut-rate price of $50 per 1,000 cubic
meters and initially proposed only a $10 increase over
the 25-year life of the Turkmenistan-Russia gas supply
agreement, signed in 2003.120 More recently, however,
Turkmenistan and Russia have been in dispute over
the pricing of gas, leading to a complete halt in natural
gas supplies in 2004 and Turkmenistan’s insistence
on a price system more in line with the resale value of
natural gas in European markets.121
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Despite its principled approach to the energy charter,
Europe’s willingness to deregulate and liberalize its
energy market, let alone forge an integrated EU policy,
is problematic. Some countries, such as France, prefer to
protect national energy firms from competition, while
Germany leans toward negotiating separate deals with
Gazprom, including a direct supply of Russian gas
from the construction of a 1,200 km undersea Baltic
pipeline system, bypassing existing transit routes
through Ukraine and Poland.122 EU countries vary
greatly in levels of dependency on Russian energy,
with the Central Europeans, Baltic states, and Finland
among the most heavily dependent on imported
gas (see Table 2). For example, Finland imports 100
percent of its natural gas from Russia. Although the
share of natural gas is only about 10 percent of the total
energy consumption, Finland also depends on Russia
for 70 percent of its oil and coal imports. Altogether, 70
percent of Finnish energy imports comes from Russia
which in 2004 translated into 50 percent of total energy
use. Poland imports 58 percent of its natural gas from
Russia, or 13 percent of consumption; 97 percent of its
crude oil, accounting for 24 percent of consumption;
making domestically produced coal the largest source
of Poland’s energy needs, accounting for around 60
percent of consumption.123 By comparison, Germany
gets about one-third of its imported oil (37 percent of
its consumption) and 40 percent of its gas requirements
(23 percent of its consumption) from Russia, while
several countries, including Spain, Portugal, Sweden,
and Norway do not import any gas from Russia.124
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Major European Recipients of Russian Gas Exports, 2004.
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Source: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Energy Information
Administration (EIA), Country Analysis Briefs, Russia, “Natural
Gas,” January 2006; BP (2005), CIS and E. European Databook,
2005.

Table 2.
In these varied conditions, the collective good
has given way to national solutions, particularly the
interests of the large European gas importers, such as
Germany and Italy. When the North European Gas
Pipeline was initiated by Germany, it was welcomed
by the EU and much of Western Europe which faced
falling production in Norway and Great Britain. As
much as it affords Old Europe an alternate source of
supply, Russia’s temporary shut-off in January 2006
of gas transiting through Ukraine over a price dispute
set off alarm bells. This dispute revealed the risk that
commercial or political differences also might prompt
Russia to block energy supplied directly to the West
and not just indirectly as a result of clashes with
transit countries, despite years of Soviet and Russian
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reliability.125 Unlike previous supply disruptions
affecting Ukraine, Moldova, and the Baltic states,
major Western customers such as Germany were
affected during the cold winter of 2006 by the decrease
in pressure in their pipelines. Europe’s dependency
suddenly became a security concern as many countries
learned the hard way that, as of 2005, 73 percent of
Russian natural gas began to be piped to Central
and Western Europe (with the exception of Finland)
through Ukraine. Moreover, the Baltic Sea pipeline
to Germany, which is scheduled for completion in
2010, will reduce this volume by less than 10 percent;
Ukrainian pipelines will still carry 66 percent of Russia’s
gas exports to Europe.126 It is an open question whether
Putin and some members of his administration now
appreciate the shortsightedness of Gazprom’s cutoff to
Ukraine or were deliberately signaling Europeans that
Moscow has coercive power and wants to renegotiate
the terms of its relationships. In either case, nothing
better illustrates Moscow’s commitment problem
in political and economic affairs, especially coming
not long after the trial and sentencing of Yukos CEO
Mikhail Khodorkovskii.
European concerns about Moscow’s coercive
handling of the Ukrainian crisis are complicated by
that country’s corruption, its profligate use of energy
and frequent payment arrears, and recent failure to
open and reform the energy sector, not to mention the
irony of Russia and former Soviet republics in Central
Asia subsidizing the independence of post-Soviet states
with cheap energy for more than a decade.127 What the
Ukrainian gas crisis underscores is that Brussels lacks
not only a unified energy policy but also a serious strategy for dealing with front-line states such as Moldova
and Ukraine which, despite the Orange Revolution,
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remains captured to a large degree by Russian energy
interests and vulnerable to exploitation and bullying
by Russia. Corrupt government and business practices
long favored Russian firms. As a result, 80 percent of
refining capacity in Ukraine is owned by Russia.
At a transatlantic conference in late April 2006,
European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso
diplomatically highlighted such concerns without
explicitly mentioning Russia or Brussels’ long-standing
neglect of the problem. “We are seeing more frequently
the use of energy resources as an instrument of political
coercion,” Barroso said, just days before Vice President
Dick Cheney’s more blunt comments on the same
issue.128 Subsequently, Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russia’s
former Gazprom chief, Yeltsin’s prime minister,
and now Russian ambassador to Ukraine, affirmed
that “Where there are bad political relations, good
economic [affairs] just don’t happen.” Yushchenko’s
pro-Western stance, and particularly Kyiv’s public
intention to seek NATO membership, have harmed
relations with Moscow, according to Chernomyrdin,
who maintained that “politics and economics are,
unfortunately, inseparable.”129
In its most recent Green Paper on Energy, issued in
March 2006, the European Commission acknowledges
the need to take additional measures beyond the ENP
and Action Plans to create a common regulatory space
around Europe and a predictable and transparent
market, as well as “security of supply, for the EU and
its neighbours.”130 The EU and Ukraine agreed in a
memorandum of understanding at their December
2005 Summit that Kyiv will “progressively align
with EU energy legislation and rules, and gradually
integrate with the EU energy market, as foreseen in the
ENP Action Plan for Ukraine.” The Annex to the Green
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Paper further underlines the particular vulnerability
of Moldova, “not only to unilateral actions from a
party with monopoly status in the energy area, but
also to steep and sudden increases in the pricing of
energy.” Given that Moldova is also a transit country
for Russian gas to Romania, Greece, and Turkey,
and to the Balkans, Brussels is pursuing an agenda
for cooperation on energy issues with Chisinau as
part of its ENP action plan.131 Such tepid first steps,
however, will mean little if they are not followed
with concrete actions to ensure transparency and
accountability in East European energy deals. Europe’s
vulnerabilities will only multiply if Russia’s quest for
unconstrained monopolistic power is unchecked by
international rules and market competition. EU Energy
Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, who is from Latvia,
readily appreciates the need for “real coordination”
and “pro-active policy” on securing and diversifying
gas supplies.132 But it remains to be seen whether the
EU has sufficient political will to pursue its collective
interests, including those of its most vulnerable new
members in Central Europe and the Baltic states, let
alone to recognize that supporting Ukraine’s European
aspirations and reforms in other borderland countries
could also promote Europe’s energy security.
Also troubling for Europeans are the periodic
threats by Gazprom to divert supplies to China and
elsewhere as partial retaliation for being blocked from
acquiring European energy assets and the move by the
Kremlin to break production sharing agreements with
Western energy companies for oil and gas extraction
in Eastern Russia. Moscow’s new policy requires that
the government retain controlling rights of at least 50
percent for strategic industries such as energy and
mineral resources. Thus, Gazprom decided to develop
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the Shtokman field independently and redirect a larger
percentage of the gas to Europe, although Putin did not
rule out the possibility of foreign firms participating in
development and partial liquefication of gas for other
markets.133 Russia still seeks and desperately needs
Western investment in energy projects, preferring
asset swapping deals similar to those with German
firms in the North Sea Gas Pipeline project, but it is
pressing harder for reciprocal rights to acquire utilities,
pipelines, natural-gas facilities and other infrastructure
in Europe and the United States. The risk of allowing
Moscow a bigger foothold in the EU distribution
system is that Gazprom’s suppliers will not invest
in alternative sources or transit means to meet rising
demand, and thereby draw European countries deeper
into Russia’s oil and gas orbit.
At the same time, Moscow’s bluster on new markets
and its supposed superior bargaining position must
be counterbalanced by Gazprom’s critical reliance on
current European profits. Sales of Russian raw materials
to the EU provide needed foreign currency, about 25
percent of GDP and nearly 50 percent of the Russian
federal budget. Gazprom itself sells only 30 percent of
its production to Europe, reserving about 70 percent
for Russia, but depends on the European market for
70 percent of its earnings because domestic prices are
only 15-20 percent of the export price to Europe.134
Probably the greatest risk to Europe and corresponding incentive to pursue energy diversification more
vigorously is the very real prospect that Russian
capacity will be unable to meet Europe’s growing
demand. Russia’s principal resource curse is that it
lacks adequate resources for a country bent more on
state control and redistribution of wealth than much
needed reforms and investment.135 The Russian
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Energy Strategy to 2020 issued in 2003 only foresees an
increase in total gas exports of some 50 million tons of
oil equivalent between the years 2000 and 2020. These
additional 50 million tons are not only for the EU which
is forecasted to need an additional 200 million tons of
oil equivalent by 2020. Moreover, the Russian strategy,
which underscores problems of aging capital stock,
inefficient equipment, and lack of modern technology,
depends on significant investments of about $200
billion.136 The International Energy Agency projects
that on average about $11 billion per year is needed
to ensure adequate export and domestic supplies,
but that this is 20 percent more than current (2003)
investment.137
Russia possesses 27 percent of the world’s known
gas reserves as well as vast oil fields. It is the world’s
largest exporter of natural gas and second-largest
exporter of oil, after Saudi Arabia. However, after
declining during the 1990s, domestic gas output is
suffering from under-investment in infrastructure and
new fields and is leveling off or rising only slightly.
The Russian gas industry, dominated by the statecontrolled Gazprom, is by most measures Russia’s
least reformed and perhaps most inefficient sector.
Its labor unit costs were more than double the levels
of 1997 and despite a drop of around 20 percent in
labor productivity, wages which were four times
higher than the overall industrial average before the
1998 crisis rose much faster afterwards. In 2000-04,
industrial output rose by about 40 percent, crude
oil output rose by 50 percent, while gas production
stagnated and even had a slightly negative impact
on Russia’s GDP growth (1999-2004).138 As a result,
Russia depends more on increasing production from
independent producers and cheaper foreign suppliers,
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such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, to
meet its expanding commitments.139 As already noted,
Gazprom extracts high rents from these arrangements
and is determined to be the monopsonist buyer in parts
of Central Asia, locking in long-term agreements with
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and reselling the gas
to Europe. However, Moscow increasingly resembles
the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, promising more gas exports
than it realistically can deliver. At a summit in Beijing
in March 2006, President Putin promised 60-80 billion
cubic feet of gas to China and the Asia-Pacific region
as early as 2011 through pipelines that have yet to be
built.140 Putin and Gazprom subsequently reassured
Europe of secure supplies if Russia is allowed a
foothold in downstream infrastructure. Moscow is
similarly overcommitted on oil, agreeing in 2005
to build a pipeline to Nakhodka, on the Pacific, to
supply multiple customers, but then in March Putin
announced an extremely costly branch line also
would go to China. Energy experts warn that $70 oil
prices encourage governments to act dysfunctionally,
such as by blocking FDI or building uneconomical
pipelines.141
Europe’s energy situation also will be affected
negatively by the fact that Russia, like Ukraine, is
among the most energy inefficient economies in the
world with respect to both households and firms and
has significant transportation costs, given its large
territory. Russia already is the world’s third largest
consumer of energy, so continued domestic economic
growth is likely to add to the pressures on available
supply. Russia is the second largest gas user, after the
United States, despite an economy 20 times smaller,
and energy use per unit of output in manufacturing
is twice the rate of Western Europe. The Russian
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economy uses about 500 million tons of hydrocarbons
(oil and gas converted into oil equivalent) per year,
which amounts to the total annual production of Saudi
Arabia. Not surprisingly, Russia only exports about
the equivalent of three tons of oil per capita annually
which makes it unlikely that Russia will have sufficient
resources for all of its economic modernization projects,
not to mention the greed of state officials.142 Meanwhile
only independent Russian energy companies are
performing well while state enterprises like Gazprom
are stagnating and running high debts. Instead of using
its energy wealth to invest and restructure priority
sectors of the economy, the government engages in
further encroachments, enriching the new oligarchs
in the Kremlin and their cronies while leaving Russia
vulnerable to an economic crash when energy prices
finally come down. Without dramatic increases in
foreign investment to develop new fields, Russia
could be forced to raise domestic prices considerably
higher than planned, which will dampen what Russian
energy experts consider a “too high” dependence on
natural gas, but also possibly cause disruptions to
manufacturing.143
Walking this tightrope adds economic incentives to
Moscow’s geopolitical agenda for cutting subsidized
gas (in Ukraine on the level of $3 to $5 billion per
year) and adopting across the board gas price rises to
CIS countries, including Belarus. Thus Putin lectured
visiting media executives in June 2006 that the West
should pick up the cost if it wants Ukraine to pay belowmarket prices for its gas. “Why should consumers in
Germany pay $250 per thousand cubic meters and
those in Ukraine $50?” Insisting that Russia no longer
would provide such subsidies, Putin asserted, “If you
[the West] want to give Ukraine that kind of gift, then
pay for it.”144
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For the EU, there is no alternative to pursuing
energy diversification as a hedge against the worst
case and a prudent supplement to Russian imports.
Europe must heed Winston Churchill’s strategy as
First Lord of the Admiralty for ensuring oil supplies
to the Royal Navy after shifting its power source from
coal to oil: “Safety and certainty in oil,” he insisted,
“lie in variety and variety alone.”145 Even if Europeans
rethink their aversion to nuclear energy, which seems
improbable outside of a few countries like France
for the present, needed future energy resources will
require greater external capacity, particularly given
current limitations on renewable energy. According
to the EU’s Green Paper, “The challenge is to ensure
a continued high level of diversification of supply.” It
lists several options although a more critical assessment
is necessary. With respect to natural gas, the choices
include North Africa, which cannot adequately meet
Europe’s demand; liquefied natural gas (LNG), which
is expanding notably but is expensive and requires
large investments in infrastructure and transport;146 and
Iran, which has the world’s second largest gas reserves
after Russia but is politically more dicey, currently on
hold as a result of the nuclear dispute, and already has
large commitments to China and India. Nonetheless
EU leaders look to a quick start to the Nabucco pipeline
which will cross Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary,
and Austria, and make it possible to transport gas from
the Caspian region, Iran, and the Middle East to the
European market with a capacity of up to 31 bcm by
2020.147 Together with the United States, there is also
now EU support for a Trans-Caspian pipeline to free
Central Asian energy from Russian domination and to
promote a more competitive and transparent market
while reducing Moscow’s commercial and political
leverage.
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The more difficult challenge for the EU is to
recognize that its “special relationship” with Russia
legitimates precisely the sort of myopic, bilateral deals
best illustrated by the German-Russian energy cartel
while fostering Moscow’s commercial and political
leverage at the expense of open markets and liberal
reforms. Resisting the external checks and balances
and regulations associated with large international
investments, the Putin administration deepens the
confluence of political and business interests in Russia
with its policy of renationalizations in important
sectors of the economy. The grabs by the Kremlin
are continuing beyond the destruction of Yukos and
the government’s acquisition of a 51 percent stake in
Gazprom.148 Russia’s extraordinary concentration of
wealth and power fuels corruption and unchecked
greed while stalling economic reform and solidifying
authoritarian tendencies. According to a former Russian
finance minister and Gazprom board member, some
“$2 billion to $3 billion disappears from Gazprom each
year through corruption, nepotism, and simple theft.”149
The tangle of Byzantine domestic politics, economic
corruption, and swelling geopolitical ambitions, based
on a faulty image of Russia as a petrostate,150 spins a
noxious web that ultimately could ensnare Russia
again in backwardness when the price of hydrocarbons
drops, blocking development of an open society and
rule of law for many more years.
The EU let slip a signal opportunity to make
inroads towards promoting energy diversification
and more open markets when it endorsed Russia for
WTO membership without gaining any substantial
concessions on key regulatory issues, let alone a
commitment to increase gas production. President
Putin dismissed the EU’s feeble attempts to engage in
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“arm-twisting,” with the admonishment that “Russia’s
arms are getting stronger and the EU won’t succeed in
twisting them.”151 European leaders have been slow to
question how Russia can expect to create a Common
Economic Space with the EU or solve its commitment
problem if it refuses to follow accepted rules of market
regulation. Yet absent international pressure or a
prior foundation in rule of law, arguably Russia will
not wean itself off its natural-resource dependency
or escape the associated curses of autocratic politics,
corruption, and myth-making.152 Without a more
effective EU strategy, Europe may have to cope with
an aggressive monopoly supplier in future energy
disputes or supply disruptions caused by Russia’s
economic mismanagement and criminal behavior.
Given the dangers of energy interdependence and
Russia’s reliance on Europe for trade, it is paradoxical
that Russia’s partnership with the EU is the weakest and
least institutionalized of its three special relationships
(the other two with NATO and G-8). This outcome may
be traced not only to national preferences for bilateral
relations but also to Europe’s persistent unwillingness
to agree to deeper cooperation, given Russia’s partially
reformed political and economic conditions and
inability to make credible commitments.
Mutual Ambivalence about the Europeanization
and Integration of Russia.
Besides asymmetry and commitment problems, a
third factor which underpins the EU-Russia special
relationship is that both sides have ambiguous stakes
in deeper cooperation. Europeans are troubled by
Russia’s failure to liberalize after 1989, but in the
prevailing view an increased military threat seems
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unlikely to materialize. Major European powers have
based their bilateral “Russia first” orientations on this
assumption. Europeans acknowledge the negative
impact of unrealistic expectations about the scope of
change in Russia, continued ideological biases, and
Western policy inconsistency.153 Yet there is a hope,
particularly in Western European countries, that with
continued interaction and generational change, Russia
may still converge to European values and norms. The
incorporation of eight new members in 2004 from the
former Soviet bloc has intensified the EU’s focus on
problems in the new borderlands, increased the EU’s
vulnerability to energy disruptions, and raised the
level of concerns about Russia’s failure to democratize
and resist imperial temptations. As a consequence,
Brussels finds it still more difficult to produce a
coherent and integrated policy towards Russia.
But whatever differences exist on the modalities of
cooperation, no one in a position of authority in Brussels
or the national capitals (with the unserious exception of
Silvio Berlusconi, the former prime minister of Italy)
endorses the idea of promoting Russia’s formal accession
to the EU as a stimulus to dislodge its frozen reforms.
Europeans remain profoundly ambivalent about the
realistic possibilities for substantive deep cooperation
with Russia and strongly resist any proposal, beyond
a free trade zone after Russia enters the WTO, which
involves Russia’s integration into EU institutions.
The EU’s special relationship with Russia is a natural
outgrowth of such preferences.
With the weaker but strengthening hand, Moscow’s
ambivalence is greater still, sustained not only by
doubts about the benefits of integration but also by
years of polarized politics and the wellspring of resentment, sense of exclusion, and anti-Western attitudes
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among elites and those whose interests run counter to
open markets and liberal politics. It manifests itself in
contradictory policies in which Russia simultaneously
pursues equal partnership and special relations with
the EU, special relations with the United States, and
a leading role for itself in the integration of the CIS,
as well as assorted partnerships with rising powers in
Asia.
Western integration was always the preferred
strategy of Russia’s dwindling number of liberals who
tended to view relations with Russia’s neighbors as of
secondary importance or troublesome legacies from
the Soviet past which, like Russia’s antiquated military
industrial complex, were best ignored. However,
Russia got trapped in the early stages of reform and
failed to develop democratic institutions and the rule
of law while the United States and Europe avoided
a commitment to full integration. Such a Western
commitment would have necessitated developing a
strategy to help anchor a reform-oriented Russia in the
safe harbor of Western institutions. With the failure of
liberalization in Russia, it was predictable that the West
and Russia’s liberals would become the scapegoats for
the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as Russia’s
economic decline and imperial retrenchment in the
1990s.
Russia’s political class not only shares Putin’s
perspective on the breakup of the Soviet Union as one
of the greatest tragedies of the last century but also
views the 1990s as a time of chaos when Russia, as
Vladislav Surkov, the deputy head of the presidential
administration, emphasized in a recent speech, “was
on the verge of losing its sovereignty.”154 It follows
that despite Putin’s strong affinity for Europe and
an economic modernization strategy premised on
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good relations with the West, the Kremlin has not
relied exclusively on the European or Western path to
modernization.155 The Putin administration consistently
has emphasized the restoration of Russia’s national
power and influence and recently also shifted to a
more mercantilist approach to economic development.
In Russia it is no longer acceptable for large Russian
corporations in strategic sectors to merge with major
foreign multinational corporations and thereby
lose controlling interest, as in the case of TNK-BP.
Ironically, the minister of finance acknowledges that
“the expansion of the state’s share of the oil sector
will constrain the development of this sector of the
economy.”156 Nonetheless, under the new rules, the
integration of Russia’s leading economic sectors into
the global economy will follow the national model
in which the state controls at least 51 percent interest
as in Gazprom and Rosneft and the rest is sold to a
strategic partner like Ruhrgas or WestinghouseGas or
floated through initial public offerings (IPOs) in the
free market.
Putin also supports large concentrations of capital
and monopolies, subordinated to the Kremlin, because
he sees them as levers of control, the ultimate means
of political patronage and instruments of foreign
policy, as demonstrated by Russia’s gas distribution
monopoly in Europe. Some estimates indicate that the
government share of industrial output and employment
is now 40 percent, up from about 30 percent in 2003.
To some observers it seems as if, instead of efficiently
regulating the economy, “the state owns the economy.”
According to a Russian economist, “even private
owners know that their property rights are contingent
on their relationships with the Kremlin.”157
Russia’s current ruling group includes a sizable
number of siloviki, presidential cronies from St.
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Petersburg as well as elites from the apparat whose
attitudes broadly correlate with the direction of policy
under Putin, with the notable exception that their
national and foreign agenda is strongly anti-Western,
especially anti-American.158 Such people bitterly dismiss
“the dreams about a single European economic expanse
nurtured by the perestroika heroes” as naïve.159 They
support a strong state directing society and the economy
as well as a powerful military and defense industry.
This ideological orientation centers on the restoration
of the traditional Russian state and requires a struggle
against external and internal enemies, which include
the United States and its Western allies. Thus, Surkov
labored in a 2004 interview to find an appropriate way
to describe Putin’s cordial relationships with American
and European leaders within Moscow’s dominant antiWestern world view. Surkov resorted to distinguishing
between a “good” West and a “bad” West. The former
welcomes a stronger Russia as a “good neighbor and
reliable ally” while the second seeks to “destroy Russia
and fill its enormous geographic space with numerous
unviable quasi-state entities,” relying on the help of a
“fifth column” of domestic opponents for support.160
Even President Putin, who continues to emphasize
positive relations with Washington, was not above
taking a swipe at the Bush administration in his May
2006 address to the nation, calling for more effective
defense in a world where “Comrade Wolf knows
whom to eat and doesn’t listen to anyone.” Not so the
major European powers, who are more often part of
the “good” West and ill-disposed to the use of force,
when they are not unduly influenced, according
to presidential aide Sergei Yastrzhembskii, by the
“Russophobic” politically immature Easterners, who
were “integrated into Europe with all their inferiority
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complexes.”161
Putin frequently refers to how “Russia was and
will remain a great power,” and reaffirms Russia’s
traditional reliance on a “great, powerful and mighty
state.” In his 1999 Millennium manifesto, Putin
emphasized that “For Russians, a strong state is not an
anomaly, which should be got rid of . . . [but rather] a
guarantor of order and the initiator and main driving
force of any change.” For elites who embrace a national
identity which features traditional velikhoderzhavie,
or attachment to great power status, the starkness of
Surkov’s characterization is a fitting reflection of their
wounded pride over Russia’s perceived loss of position
at the end of the Cold War. According to a policy
planner in the foreign ministry, “nothing the West is
doing to help Russia join the WTO, to develop closer
cooperation with the EU, to establish equal interaction
with NATO, etc. . . . can be regarded as a complete
and adequate compensation for the lost strategic
security that took many decades to be created.”162 The
suggestion that the world might look different had
Russia blazed a path of reform, joined Western clubs,
and recovered economically is dismissed by many
careerists with a mixture of incredulity and hostility at
the preposterousness of such counterfactual thinking.163
With power and position deemed greater virtues than
virtuous circles of democratic and market reform,
many Russian elites see as degrading the notion that
Russia should get in line behind puny, former Soviet
satellites to press for membership in an unwelcoming
EU or NATO.164 Such resentment underscores a firm
determination that “Russia will never accept the role of
a poor relation, which the West would like to impose
on it.”165
In this perspective, it makes sense not only
to strengthen the state, but also develop Russia’s
70

comparative advantage as an “energy superpower”
and in other strategic industries, and reinvigorate the
former Soviet space, not as a historical atavism in the
Soviet mold but as a developing economic zone with
Russia as its powerful center. The Russian president
warned diplomats in his 2004 speech at the Russian
foreign ministry that “the absence of an effective
Russian policy in the CIS or even an unjustified pause
inevitably will entail nothing more than energetic
occupation of this political space by other, more active
states.” Concern about Western encroachments into
the former Soviet space initially centered on the United
States and NATO’s expansion, but increasingly the EU
has come under criticism for problems connected to its
enlargements, democracy promotion programs, and
attempts at conflict resolution in former Soviet bloc
countries. As discussed above, Brussels is engaged
in a range of ENP activities which Moscow sees as
interference in Russia’s borderlands.
Nonetheless, it has been no easy task to find an
effective strategy to promote Russia’s interests in the
post-Soviet space, partly because of disagreement over
what those interests should be. Opinion in Moscow
was still divided in 2004, a truly annus horribilis for
Russia when the blows from the Beslan school hostage
disaster and the Ukrainian election debacle shook the
confidence of the government. Three main schools of
thought, ranging from neoimperial to “benevolent
integrationist” and pragmatic bilateralism, dominated
the debate.166 Reacting to a perceived urgent need to
stop the retreat from Russia’s traditional sphere of
interest, the neoimperialists argued that the forces
underpinning the Rose revolution in Georgia and
Western orientations in other post-Soviet countries
threatened the existence of the CIS. The neoimperialists
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called for redoubled efforts to assert Russian
dominance in the region, using all available means of
political and economic influence and Russia’s military
presence in the former Soviet areas. The “benevolent
integrationist” model holds that post-Soviet countries,
due to civilizational dissimilarities and differences in
values, are not a good fit for the EU. “Only Russia,”
asserts a Kremlin-connected analyst, can lead the
process of building a Evrovostok—“Euro-East”—which
in turn eventually will be transformed into a higherlevel, Europe-wide process of integration involving
western Europe.167 By comparison, the “pragmatists”
question the value of the “paper integration”
underpinning the CIS and favor prioritizing relations
with CIS countries according to Russia’s national
interests and conducting bilateral relations instead.
Aggressive expansion of Russian capital, penetration
of information markets, and a naturalization program
for CIS migrants can turn Russia into a true leader and
magnet for the majority of the post-Soviet countries,
according to Sergei Karaganov, a leading proponent of
this school.
Two democratic oriented strategies have gained
almost no political traction. One is a liberal variant of
the integrationist approach championed by Anatolii
Chubais, the controversial architect of privatization
in the Yeltsin administration and now head of the
United Energy System, who has argued for a liberal
empire in which private business is a powerful agent
of market reforms and gradually the development of
democratic government. The second strategic idea,
outlined by Konstantin Kosachev, head of the State
Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee, suggests that
Moscow should present a “democratic alternative” to
more authoritarian options, partly to counter Western
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advances in the region. According to Kosachev, Russia
needs a strategy that will eliminate “the widespread
representation of Russia’s influence and presence in the
post-Soviet space as a phenomenon which thwarts the
development of democracy.”168 Predictably, neither of
these strategies could find support after the post-Beslan
emphasis on security and further moves to centralize
power. Russia could hardly be a credible exporter of
democracy in the region when it has its own serious
deficit of democracy at home. Just days after the Beslan
atrocity, in a meeting with Western analysts Putin
warned that democracy can be “counterproductive” if
it is introduced too quickly or in ways not in conformity
with the development of society.169
Undeterred, as 2004 was ending, Kosachev
returned to the subject, warning that Russia will not
out-compete Western countries and organizations in
the CIS successfully if they address the people directly
under the banner of democratization, while Russia
is openly preoccupied with pursuit of narrow selfinterests and can offer no “unifying projects.” Other
commentators struggled unsuccessfully to identify
values and projects that would be attractive in the
region, while Karaganov squarely pinpointed the
importance and attractiveness of economic success. “If
we don’t have an economically viable and politically
attractive model,” Karaganov bluntly warned, “other
countries . . . will reorient themselves towards the
EU.”170
At the CIS summit in August 2005, Putin maintained that the organization still had a future but also
admitted that changes were needed, and a reevaluation
was still underway. Deputy foreign minister Grigorii
Karasin and other government officials signaled
Moscow’s acknowledgement that it did not have a
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monopoly on the post-Soviet space and realistically
could not oppose the involvement of the United States
or the EU in a civilized competition of ideas there.
However in newspaper interviews, Karasin warned that
Russia would not tolerate “forced ‘democratization’”
or “color revolutions” in Russia’s borderlands, and that
Western interests could never equal Russia’s in this
region. Other high-ranking officials likewise declared
that Russia’s aid and subsidized energy supplies would
now be targeted to advance geopolitical priorities, and
that Moscow would eliminate discounts to Westernoriented countries.171 The move by Georgian President
Mikhail Saakashvili and Ukrainian President Viktor
Yushchenko in August 2005 to create a new regional
organization, the Commonwealth of Democratic
Choice, with the aim of uniting all democratic states
in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Caspian regions, and
promoting their integration into the Euro-Atlantic
community, underscored the sharp divisions between
CIS countries still largely within Moscow’s orbit and
those seeking to break free and join the West.
Russia’s Multi-Vector Strategy and the Mixed
Appeal of “Euro-East.”
Faced with more acute geopolitical competition in
its declared sphere of interests, the Kremlin gradually
settled on a differentiated approach to the post-Soviet
states that is both more bilateral and more muscular.
Russian policy now would reward more powerfully
friendly governments while punishing renegades.
This approach was not entirely new in design, but the
intention is to strengthen its implementation.
Moscow has long used a variety of inducements
and coercive means to gain a hegemonic position in
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the former Soviet space, from subsidizing energy and
exchanging large debts for a share in the ownership of
strategic industries and infrastructure to using Russian
capital for major buyouts of oil refineries, banks,
aluminum plants, and other key sectors and pushing
for the creation of a Single Economic Space with a single
policy on trade, taxes, currency, and other economic
and financial activities.172 Countries such as Moldova,
Georgia, Belarus, and especially Ukraine owed enormous debts to Russia in relation to their state budgets,
often insisted on paying in barter, and reportedly siphoned off gas illegally for their own use, prompting
Russian companies to cut off gas supplies many times
before the January 2006 crisis. Such mismanagement of
their economies has been self-defeating financially, and
made it more costly and difficult for these countries
to pursue a fully independent foreign policy.173 Thus,
under Shevardnadze, the Georgian government was
compelled to agree not to pursue NATO membership,
while Yushchenko’s government has been unable to
break free from the stranglehold of Russian economic
penetration and dependency in energy and metallurgy,
in part because of the collusion of Ukrainian oligarchs
and middlemen. Moscow also has exploited the
Russian minority and supported separatism in Crimea
to put political pressures on Kyiv.
Throughout the 1990s and during Putin’s rule,
Russia also has put the squeeze on aspirants for EU and
NATO membership, not only in the Baltic states but
also in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, in countries
such as Bulgaria.174 Vagit Alekperov, the president
of Russia’s oil giant, LUKOIL, candidly bragged in a
2001 interview on the Russian oil industry’s expansion
in Eastern Europe that he was “certain that Bulgaria,
whose oil sector is owned almost entirely by Russian
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companies, will not conduct an anti-Russian foreign
policy in the foreseeable future.”175 Yet Moscow was
unable to draw this former close Soviet ally back
into its orbit or prevent its turn toward Euro-Atlantic
institutions, despite Bulgaria’s high dependency on
Russian gas supplies, major Russian investments
(especially during the UN’s economic embargo on
Serbia which isolated Bulgaria from EU markets),
and its role as a major transit juncture for energy
supplies into Europe. The Putin administration has
made a more concerted effort to gain control over
energy transit and consumption by penetrating the
gas transmission network and preventing alternative
sources and routes from the Caspian. The complicated
mix of energy inputs for dependent countries such
as Bulgaria makes it especially difficult to increase
diversification while also meeting EU regulations. For
example, in 2006, Bulgaria faced simultaneous pressure
from the EU to close its aging Kozlodui nuclear power
plant, which uses technology similar to the ill-fated
Chernobyl station in Ukraine, and from Russia over
the cash pricing of gas provided in lieu of transit fees.
Ironically, Moscow often has been more successful in
gaining preferential treatment for Russian firms than
in advancing Russia’s geopolitical interests, although
this may not overly trouble the new oligarchs in the
Kremlin who see the two as synonymous. Despite
years of various types of coercion and inducements as
well as Russian intelligence, criminal, and subversive
activities, Sofia generally has resisted Moscow’s
geopolitical gambits since it joined NATO and entered
into accession negotiations with the EU.
Russia is even more determined not to suffer the
same fate in the post-Soviet space. Thus, although
many Russian elites think that the CIS is obsolete and
should be eliminated, the government firmly is
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committed to promoting Russia’s strategic interests in
Eurasia with or without this organization. According
to Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s
top concern is the domestic situation of the former
Soviet republics and nearby regions. In an obvious
warning to the West and Russia’s wayward neighbors,
Ivanov emphasized that the Russian military had to
be prepared to intervene in a “political or militarypolitical conflict or process that has a potential to pose
a direct threat to Russia’s security, or to change the
geopolitical reality in a region of Russia’s strategic
interest.”176 Moscow’s strong measures in the escalation
of tensions between Russia and Georgia in the autumn
of 2006 indicate its firmer stance.
Without discounting the importance of such
signaling, political and economic instruments of
foreign policy clearly remain in the forefront of
Russia’s intensified realpolitik in the borderlands.
Taking a page from the EU strategy book, Moscow is
resurrecting its 1999 goal of creating a single economic
space in the CIS, this time drawing on the gravitational
field of Russia’s growing market and the opportunities
this presents for some of Russia’s neighbors whose
citizens find readily available work in the expanding
Russian economy. According to Putin, Russia already
has natural advantages in the region from the past—a
single energy system, transport infrastructure, deep
economic cooperation, and a common language
(Russian), and it would be “simply stupid not to use
them.”177 Although details about the newly proposed
economic zones remain sketchy, some Russians
envision a greater Europe in which there is a loose
association,178 or even a “strategic union,”179 between
the EU and Russia-led countries in Eurasia. At least
one variant foresees overarching cooperation not
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only in economics and trade, but also between the EU
and NATO on one hand and the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO) which includes Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and, as
of 2005, Uzbekistan, on the other.
Dizzy from the success of sustained high economic
growth and energy wealth, Russian officials and
elites are happy to convince themselves that Russia
is fast becoming an “indispensable” great power.
Such confidence bolsters a familiar claim recently
resurrected by Russian diplomats, namely, as Deputy
Foreign Minister Vladimir Chizhov insists, “The future
of Europe is impossible without Russia, without its
active participation in the processes occurring on our
continent.”180 Chizhov went on to explain that Russia
does not “regard the existing contradictions” between
its EU and CIS strategies “as insurmountable” and
hopes to “bring the integration processes in the postSoviet area in sync with the course of the expanding and
deepening European integration, including within the
EU framework, so that they complement each other.”
Similarly, leader of the Motherland nationalist party
Dmitry Rogozin asserts that “building a united Europe
without the largest country in Europe—Russia—is
practically impossible.”181
Given the proliferation of international organizations in post-Soviet Eurasia and emergence of competing geopolitical agendas, there are obvious strategic
underpinnings to the Russian debate over the “CIS
project,” the CSTO, and other alternative means
to promote Russia’s national interests. However,
Moscow’s “multi-vector” foreign policy line reaches
beyond collaborations in Europe and Eurasia to more
extensive involvement in Asia, which according to
some politicians, has usefully strengthened Russia’s
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positions with the United States and EU.182 Which
vectors loom most prominently over time will help
reveal the strength of competing agendas and interests
in Russia’s internal debate over its role in the postSoviet space. Significantly, the strongest opponents of
partnership with the EU warn that Russia’s convergence
to EU norms would diminish its power and “unique
Euro-Asian role” and thereby derail its leadership
in directing the reintegration of the CIS. As a former
deputy foreign minister bluntly intones, “great powers
. . . do not dissolve in integration unions—they create
them around themselves.”183
Integration with the West: An Idea Whose Time
Keeps Coming.
It is an exaggeration, however, to suggest that
the Russian government and political class have
fully abandoned the idea of integration into Western
institutions, such as the EU, in favor of more limited
and gradual economic integration into the global
economy.184 Strikingly, Konstantin Kosachev has
remarked that “the time is already coming” to talk
about Russia joining the EU. “The problem,” he
observes, “lies in the fact that the EU has still not
determined what kind of strategic relations it wants to
build with Russia, and the same can also be observed
on the Russian side.”185 A survey in mid-2005 of
leading Russian experts on relations with the EU
echoed Kosachev, criticizing Russian policy for a lack
of “strategic vision” of Russia’s place in Europe and
poor administrative execution of the administration’s
declared “European choice.” Reflecting a strain of
Putin’s thinking, these experts concluded that there
are no “objective insurmountable obstacles” to raising
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the question of Russia’s formal accession to the EU.
However, to preclude unrealistic expectations and
disappointment the experts recommended focusing
on practical projects for a period to reverse the current
negative state of relations.186
Nearly half of the Russians polled in 2005 expressed
trust in the EU, and 60 percent said that Russia should
seek to join—a slightly higher percentage than those
who favored joining the WTO.187 That May, in an
interview with French television, Vladimir Putin
claimed that “uniting within a single framework” is not
Russia’s objective “at the moment.” But invoking the
experience of European countries such as Norway, the
President added “at some future point, our cooperation
could reach such a level that it would be almost akin to
actual membership in the EU.”188
In an earlier press conference in 2004, Kosachev
speculated that “10 years ago no one could imagine that
Poland or the Baltic states would become EU members.
I am sure that 10 years from now the prospects of
Russian membership of the EU will be quite different
than they are today.” Perhaps, but only 3 years later,
such statements seem oddly out of place, ironically
from a different era, as a stronger, more self-confident
Russia, and a politically weakened, often divided
Europe face diminished expectations and enthusiasm
for building a closer partnership.189
Conclusions.
European and Russian ambivalence about the
nature and scope of their relations presently do not favor
an optimal bargain in which Russia consolidates a liberal
transformation and is integrated into European and
Western institutions. Despite positive developments
in broadening the scope of Russia’s participation in
80

the NATO-Russia Council, Washington is even more
pessimistic about the political trend line in Russia,
and American politics are likely to further dampen
the outlook for deepening cooperation.190 However,
Europeans and Americans alike should avoid excessive
swings in attitudes and approaches and instead adapt
to the realities of the current paradigm until and unless
its underlying conditions change. European gravitas
can counterbalance the psychological temptation in
Russia to become enamored with a concept, such as
a Russia-dominated regional association that would
somehow “integrate” with the EU, not because it
has a basis in reality or sound strategy but because it
represents a symbol of hope that Russia is again in the
game of competitive great power politics.191
In war, “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching
act of judgment that the statesman” has to make is to
establish “the kind of war on which he is embarking.”
This insight from Clausewitz applies equally well
to understanding the framework in which the EuroAtlantic community and Russia interact. To pretend
to be engaged in a historic struggle to integrate postcommunist Russia into Western institutions and the
international order while actually pursuing a limited
liability strategy is as senseless as it is to rush to the
barricades and proclaim a new era of Cold Peace when
Russia behaves like a typical monopolist in energy
deals while simultaneously weakening its future
economic prospects, tolerating an unreformed military,
and accepting a level of political openness greater than
what prevails in China. Since the end of the Cold War,
Russia and the West have forged a basis for interaction
which favors shallow agreements rather than Pareto
optimal outcomes. The resulting special relationships
endure because, for the foreseeable future, they are
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capable of producing second-best outcomes that meet
base-line levels of acceptability to all parties—from
limited cooperation to stabilize the Balkans and limited
collaboration to delay Iran’s development of nuclear
weapons, to expansion of trade short of the creation of
a free-trade area, and deals for new pipelines and asset
swaps to fuel European consumption absent open
competition in energy and rule-based commercial
contracts.
The West has a stake in Russia’s transition to a
peaceful, market democracy but needs to recognize that
after 15 years of turbulent transition, neither dialogue
and annual summits nor self-righteous lectures will
help unfreeze Russia’s domestic political status quo
run by a corrupt clique motivated as much by murky
concentrated interests as a dysfunctional urge to outcompete the West. Radical internal reforms, if and
when they come, will be more a matter of necessity,
decided by a new set of rulers, than an outgrowth of
a spreading European normative structure. Moreover,
although the realistic opportunity for accession has had
demonstrable positive effects on domestic politics and
economics in other post-communist countries, at this
juncture Europe lacks the consensus and the capacity
to consider even in theoretical terms the possibility of
membership for Russia. If Russia undergoes its own
color revolution and if a new democratic government
follows up with liberal political and economic reforms,
then, like Ukraine, European support for deeper
cooperation will accelerate. Such a hypothetical scenario for Russia borders on fantasy at a time when the
leaders of the Orange Revolution are faltering in the
swamp of Ukrainian politics and Russian meddling.
Nonetheless, 1989 is a lesson that the impossible
sometimes materializes, and in such conditions, if
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Russians start pressing aspirations to join the EU,
Brussels’ closed door policy could become unsustainable.
For now, Europe and the United States should be candid
about the origins and limits of existing arrangements
and resist politicizing the special relationships with
Russia so long as more optimal solutions remain out
of reach.
The December 2007 deadline to renegotiate or
renew the PCA presents an opportunity to undertake a
systematic review of the respective stakes, benefits, and
limitations of the current arrangements. Using 2007 as a
stimulus, forward thinkers in Brussels and the national
capitals should form working groups with their Russian
counterparts in and outside of government to consider
the conditions that would be necessary to shift to points
along the continuum of deeper cooperation, including
a new bargain which would link positive incentives
to conditionality requirements. The agenda should
include lessons learned from 15 years of comparative
post-communist transitions and policy analysis which
highlight the serious obstacles presented by the
partial reform trap. As part of the nongovernment
work, academics, journalists, and other independent
researchers should examine the political and societal
implications of perverse corruption, racketeering,
and theft of assets, not only by reviled oligarchs like
Khodorkovskii, but also by top government leaders
and officials throughout the bureaucracy. There is
also value in systematic analysis drawing on empirical
comparisons of alternative frameworks for interaction
in Europe—Europe Agreements for EU accession
countries, European Neighborhood Action Plans, and
Partnership Agreements (i.e., Special Relationships)
such as between the EU and Russia. Ongoing
engagement on these issues cannot be expected to
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promote immediate changes in policy but will provide
more realistic assessments of tradeoffs and an analytical
base for future decisionmakers.
In the interim, the United States should continue
to support its transatlantic partners in the EU’s
engagement with Russia on resolving “frozen
conflicts” in their new neighborhood. Propinquity
favors a division of labor in which Europe takes the
lead, although more will be gained from a consistent
transatlantic line which shows resolve in promoting
outcomes consistent with Western and European values
and interests. An important part of the work involves
encouraging Moscow to resist becoming attached to
the falacy that outcomes in Montenegro and Kosovo
are universal precedents applicable to places like
Transdnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, trumping
alternative peaceful solutions to problems involving
separatist struggles and minority rights as evidenced
for example in Quebec, the Basque region of Spain,
and, even more recently, in Northern Ireland.
A second convergence of transatlantic interests
concerns the vital matter of energy security. With oil
breaking $70 per barrel and higher gas prices, the
energy factor is no longer underestimated in relations
with Russia. Even at $60 a barrel, the United States will
spend about $4,320 billion on oil imports annually, and
in 25 years the world will need 50 percent more energy
than it does now.192 Europe and the United States have
a common interest not only in energy conservation,
but also in diversification of supply, given most of
the world’s energy is concentrated in places that are
politically antagonistic or unstable, vulnerable to
terrorism, or, like Russia, lacking secure property
rights and unable to make credible commitments as
suppliers.

84

In advance of the G-8 Summit in St. Petersburg,
European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso
called for the EU and the United States to work together
to press Moscow to open its energy market and create
transparency and legal guarantees to ensure predictable
energy supplies. Warning about the frequent “use
of energy resources as an instrument of political
coercion,” Barroso argued that “[t]ogether, the EU and
the United States must send a clear signal on the need
for a paradigm shift on energy.”193 Unfortunately, the
status quo is not likely to be dislodged by diplomacy
alone. The EU, as energy commissioner Piebalgs has
emphasized, must achieve greater unity and a coherent
strategy to promote Europe’s energy security.194
Second, Europeans, with U.S. support, need to send
a credible signal to Russia that they are prepared to
underwrite the costs of greater energy diversification.
Only a united front and concerted action are likely to
prod Moscow towards accepting greater transparency
and international rules of commerce.
Mesmerized by extraordinarily high energy
prices, Russia’s rulers are consumed by the politics
of controlling the distribution of rents rather than
problems related to production and investment.195 But
the energy bubble will not last forever, and when the
end comes, Russia likely will face serious economic
and political crises if it has not yet created secure
property rights. Economic shocks of this order can
create openings for progressive political change or for
destabilizing aggressive nationalism that will positively
or negatively impact Russia’s relations with the West.
Europe and the United States need to be prepared to
support opportunities to promote deeper cooperation
or contain the damage and, to the extent possible, to
limit the ability of hostile nationalist groups to exploit
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the international situation to further their domestic
political ambitions.
If the argument developed in this monograph
is correct, progressive movement away from the
special relationships that now underpin the partial
integration equilibrium presupposes a narrowing of
the asymmetries and distributional disputes which
divide the two sides, a positive resolution of Russia’s
commitment problem, and a stronger consensus in both
Russia and Europe on the value of Russian integration.
Without discounting the long-term prospects, those
who expect near-term forward movement in any of
these dimensions are just whistling in the dark.
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